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Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts Law  
as Europe’s Constitutional Form 
ABSTRACT 
“Unity in Diversity” was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Consti-
tutional Treaty. The motto did not make it into the Treaty of Lisbon. This essay argues 
that it deserves to be kept alive albeit in a new constitutional perspective, namely the re-
conceptualisation of European law as “new type of conflicts law”. The new type of con-
flicts law which the paper advocates is not concerned with selecting the proper legal 
system in cases with connections to various jurisdictions. It is instead meant to respond 
to the increasing interdependence of formerly more autonomous legal orders and to the 
democracy failure of constitutional states which result from the external effects of their 
laws and legal decisions on non-nationals. Europe has many means to compensate these 
shortcomings. It can derive its legitimacy from that compensatory potential without de-
veloping federal aspirations. 
The paper illustrates this approach with the help of two topical examples. The first is 
the conflict between European economic freedoms and national industrial relations (col-
lective labour) law. The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ in Viking, Laval, and Rüffert in 
which the Court established the supremacy of the freedoms over national labour law is 
criticised as a counter-productive deepening of Europe’s constitutional asymmetry and 
its social deficit. 
The second example from environmental law concerns the conflict between Austria 
and the Czech Republic over the Temelín nuclear power plant. The paper criticises the 
reasoning of the ECJ which supports the Czech pro-nuclear policy. It does not suggest 
an alternative legal outcome but questions the legitimacy of legal rather than political 
decision-making.  
The introductory and the concluding sections generalise the perspectives of the con-
flicts-law approach. The introductory section takes issue with Max Weber’s national 
state. The concluding section suggests a three-dimensional differentiation of the ap-
proach which seeks to respond to the need for transnational regulation and governance. 
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Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts Law as 
Europe’s Constitutional Form* 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
“Unity in Diversity” was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Consti-
tutional Treaty.1 This motto deserves to be kept alive despite, or even because of this 
failure and the retreat of European politics from overt constitutional ambitions. It is 
even safe to say that, precisely through these failures, the need to come to grips with the 
challenges that it articulates have become more obvious. The core problem from which 
this essay departs can be simply stated: the Member States of the European Union are 
no longer autonomous. They are, in many ways, inter-dependent, and, hence, depend 
upon co-operation. However, Europe has not transformed into a federation and it cannot 
become a federation as long as its constituent actors do not agree to the federal vision. 
Should we, nevertheless, keep the federal perspective alive? The reaction to this ques-
tion cannot be uniform. In view of the histories of European democracies, their uneven 
potential and/or willingness to pursue the objectives of distributional justice, to respond 
to economic and financial instabilities, and to cope with environmental challenges, dif-
ferentiating answers suggest themselves. “Social Europe” is probably the most delicate 
among these challenges, as long as it remains, at best, unclear whether, and, if so, how, 
a European federation might respect and re-construct the embeddedness of Europe’s 
welfare state traditions. This example is by no means exceptional. The sustainability of 
the whole European project seems to depend upon the construction and institutionalisa-
tion of a “third way” between or beyond the defence of the nation state, on the one 
hand, and federalist ambitions, on the other. This chapter will explore the potential of 
the conflicts-law approach to provide perspectives within which this challenge can be 
met. 
This is not only an immodest, if not overly ambitious, suggestion, but also one which 
must not be misunderstood as a sceptic retreat from the European project. As a precau-
                                                 
*  Core arguments in this chapter were first presented on the Workshop “The changing role of law in the age of 
supra- and transnational governance” on 18-19 November 2009 at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; they 
were developed further in the Opening Lecture of the Summer School of the “New International Constitutional 
Law and Administrative Studies” Summer School on 5 July 2010 at the Central European University in Budapest. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my commentators in Madrid (Patricia Mindus, Turin, Agustín José Mené-
ndez, Leon, and Andrea Greppi, Madrid, Carlos III and the discussants on the Summer School in Budapest. They 
all have inspired very significantly the elaboration of the present text. 
1. Article I-8 Draft European Constitutional Treaty (ABl. C 310/1, 16/12/2004). 
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tionary move, the chapter will, in its first section, recall a classical address of Max We-
ber. It will use this reference to re-construct the lasting merits and accomplishments of 
the integration project. It will also, in the same Section II, address the legitimacy 
problématique of this project’s institutional design and discuss three significant theo-
retical efforts of the foundational period in order to cope with this challenge. The fol-
lowing section (Section III) will analyse the responses of these three theories to the 
post-foundational dynamics of the integration project. Arguing that all three of these 
traditions realise an exhaustion of their potential to cope with Europe’s present chal-
lenges, Section IV will present the conflicts-law approach as an alternative response to 
Europe’s legitimacy problématique. Two follow-up sections, one on the recent labour 
law jurisprudence of the ECJ (Section V), the other on its response to the conflict be-
tween the Czech Republic and Austria on atomic energy (Section VI), will illustrate the 
operation of the conflicts-law approach. The concluding Section VII will summarise its 
problems and perspectives. 
I.  MAX WEBER’S NATION STATE 
Back in 1895, Max Weber gave an inaugural address in the University of Freiburg, then 
situated in Bismarck’s Kaiserreich of 1871. His lecture was published in an enlarged 
version under the title “The National State and Economic Policy”.2 It became a real 
classic and has now regained a fascinating topicality for two reasons. The first concerns 
the object of the field study which Weber used to explain some of his more abstract 
theoretical positions and provocative political views. The field study dealt with the rea-
sons for, and the implications of, the migration of workers. It is of stunning topicality – 
and the analysis which Weber delivered excels through a precision and subtlety which is 
difficult to find in the current debates, at least in legal quarters. However, Weber also 
used this case to explain and defend a vision of the political and economic commitments 
of the nation state, which is, at best, a contrast to the European vocation – but is, never-
theless, at least negatively instructive, because it helps us to realise to what degree this 
vision is still alive in contemporary debates and legal arguments.3 
Weber drew upon the empirical work which he had undertaken in 1892, while still a 
Pivatdozent in Berlin, in the context of a major Enquète of the Verein für Sozialpolitik 
(Association for Social Reform) on the situation of the agrarian work-force in the Ger-
man Reich. He had focused there on “the posting of workers” from Poland to the Prus-
                                                 
2  Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, (Freiburg i.Br.: C.A. Wagner, 1895) [citations here are from 
Ben Fowkes’ translation in (1980) 9 Economy and Society, pp. 420-449]. 
3  See the stunning example of the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof discussed in Section VI.2.1 infra. 
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sian Province of West-Prussia. His multi-faceted analysis addressed the transformation 
of pre-modern of patriarchical structures into a capitalist agrarian economy, identified 
the pressures which this processes exerted on the landowners, described the incentive 
structure which fostered the import of “cheap labour” from the neighbouring regions of 
Poland and from the deeper East Galicia.4 The capability of the Poles to endure the 
poor working conditions and the social situation in the new agrarian economy, so We-
ber observed, was fostering the gradual increase of the Polish and the decrease of the 
German share. The great theorist of occidental rationalism felt deeply irritated. Weber 
expressed his concern about the decline of “German-ness” (Deutschtum) in West Prus-
sia, and, equally irritating in EU-perspectives, he called for corrective state measures: 
a closure of the borders to migrating workers, and the purchase of land by the state. 
Even more irritating, however, is what he submits as his “subjective” position - the 
value judgements nurturing his political advice. 
“And the nation State is for us not an indefinite something that one feels one can place 
all the higher the more its essence is shrouded in mystical gloom, but the worldly power 
organisation of the nation, and in this nation State is raison d’état for us, the ultimate 
value criterion on economic considerations too. It does not mean to us, as a strange 
misunderstanding believes: ‘state assistance’ instead of ‘self-help’, national regulation 
of economic life instead of the free play of economic forces, but we want through this 
slogan to raise the demand that for questions of German national economic policy - in-
cluding the question whether and how far the State should interfere in economic life or 
whether and when it ought instead to set the nation’s economic forces free to develop 
themselves and tear down restraints on them - in the individual case the last and deci-
sive vote ought to go to the economic and political power interests of our nation, and its 
bearer, the German State.”5 
Strong words, indeed. Even Weber’s audience in Freiburg was apparently upset, and 
Weber distanced himself later from this strong language.6 What motivated his polemic? 
Rita Aldenhoff, in her very instructive comments on the address, starts her analysis with 
a quotation from Weber’s contribution to the Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-
                                                 
4  See the fascinating reconstruction of Weber’s analysis of the underlying transformation processes by Ola Ageval, 
“Science, Values, and the Empirical Argument in Max Weber’s Inaugural Address”, (2004) 4 Max Weber Stud-
ies, pp. 157-177. 
5  The translation is not taken from the source in note 2 but was done by Iain F. Fraser, Florence. 
6  See Max Weber’s letter to his brother Alfred, cited in Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger, “Max Weber’s Inaugural Ad-
dress of 1895 in the Context of the Contemporary Debates in Political Economy”, (2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, 
pp. 143-156, at 146, note 8. 
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sozialen Kongresses held in Frankfurt in 1894. There, Weber had stated his normative 
premises quite succinctly: 
“We do want … to shape the conditions of life in a way that makes people feel good, but 
such that, under the pressures of the unavoidable struggle for life, the best in the, the 
physical and psychological qualities that we want to save for our nation, will be pre-
served. Well … these are value-judgments and they are changeable. Anyway, there is an 
irrational element.” 
Is this a pure nationalist talking? “German-ness”, as defined, can neither be understood 
as some form of brutal nationalism; nor does it have anything in common with the homo 
economicus, as we know from mainstream economic theorising. Weber’s homini are 
human beings; he exposes them to demands of a different quality. What is, at any rate, 
noteworthy is the diligence which Weber takes to differentiate between theoretical, eco-
nomic(al), and the political orientations which should, in his view, inform the 
Volkswirtschaftspolitik (economic policy-making). When he diagnoses the readiness of 
migrant workers from Poland to accept the hardships of their new existence in the “host 
state”, he is, in fact, describing what we would call a “race to the bottom” and question-
ing precisely the “willingness to starve the most” as the underlying mechanism.7 There 
is a very critical dimension in Weber’s position, in that he rejects any claim to “objec-
tive validity” of arguments presented in the name of economics; such arguments tend to 
camouflage normative judgements and political choices – a cardinal sin in the eyes of 
Weber’s epistemology. This is not to defend the substance of Weber’s pronouncements. 
We cannot but remain irritated when reading about the “role played by physical and 
psychological racial differences between nationalities [sic!] in their struggle for exis-
tence”.8 But Rita Aldenhoff’s reference to Weber’s trans-economic Menschenbild is a 
stringent defence of Weber the methodologist against Weber’s political polemics. The 
methodologist remains of great topicality in his critique of spurious claims: not only of 
the historical school, but also of neo-classical economics9 - and their negligent contem-
                                                 
7  See Ola Agevall, ibid. (note 4), p. 174.  
8  This opening statement of the inaugural address is a core reference in the debates on Webers nationalism, see, for 
example, Karl Palonen, “Was Max Weber a ‘Nationalist’? A Study in the Rhetoric of Conceptual Change, (2001) 
1 Max Weber Studies, pp. 196-214. Weber’s nationalism and his political interventions have later nurtured the 
suspicion of a liaison dangereux with Carl Schmitt (see Kjell Ebelbrekt, “What Carl Schmitt picked up in We-
ber’s Seminar: A Historical Controversy Revisited”, (2009) 14 The European Legacy, pp. 667–684; the young 
Jürgen Habermas, who had helped to provoke this debate, has clarified his assessment suggesting that it seems 
more appropriate to call Carl Schmitt Max Weber’s “natural son” (see the reference in K. Engelbrekt, p. 668). 
9  See Ola Agevall, note 4 supra, pp. 172-74. 
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porary use in misguiding rationalisations of the integration project both as a whole and 
in so many of its segments. 
II.  THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE FAILURES OF WEBER’S NATION 
STATES AND THE PROBLÉMATIQUE OF ITS INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The project of European integration can be understood and re-constructed as a response 
to the failures of the Weberian nation state, and, more generally and in broader perspec-
tives, to Europe’s bitter experiences in the twentieth century. After 50 years of integra-
tion, however, we are confronted with massive challenges: ever since the turn to major-
ity-voting in the Single European Act of 1987, the compatibility of European rule with 
its democratic commitments has been discussed with ever increasing intensity. In the 
aftermath of the French and the Dutch referenda of 2005, concerns about its neo-liberal 
tilt and the social deficit, i.e., the compatibility of its institutional design and the welfare 
traditions of European democracies moved to centre stage. The Irish “No” of 2008 to 
the Treaty of Lisbon was perceived as an erosion of the permissive consensus that had 
backed the progress of integration. During the present financial crisis, the instability of 
Europe’s economic constitution has become manifestly apparent. All of these unre-
solved issues and queries seem to suggest that we can no longer be sure about the sus-
tainability of the European project, but have, instead, to re-consider our premises. 
It would, of course, be absurd to assume that conceptual re-orientations, which an 
academic legal exercise, such as the one that we are undertaking, could produce ready-
made answers to the type of problems just named, or lead to immediate practical 
changes. The ambitions which we pursue when suggesting a new way of thinking are 
much more modest. But in their conceptualisation of the integration project, they propa-
gate a change of paradigmatic proportions. To summarise and accentuate how they con-
trast with prevailing views, European law tends to be portrayed as an ever growing and 
ever more comprehensive body of rules and principles of steadily richer normative 
qualities. This edifice is expected to come together through successive steps of legal 
integration. Such visions of the integration project and process rest - in part explicitly, 
in part implicitly - on daring assumptions about the social functions of law and its pow-
ers – and its leitmotiv. Giandomenico Majone has recently characterised this conundrum 
as Europe’s “operational code”: the “priority of integration over all other competing 
values”.10 One need, by no means, subscribe to his diagnosis in all of its aspects when 
realising that law can, indeed, use this operational code on its “integration through law” 
path only if, and as long as it insulates itself from many specifics of national orders, 
                                                 
10  Thus, Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power. The EU at Fifty, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 1. 
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from inherited varieties of conflict patterns and institutional mechanisms within econ-
omy and society - and even from the aspirations of its Member States and their govern-
ments. 
The messages which we are going to submit under the title of the “conflicts-law al-
ternative” differ from the prevailing visions most markedly in two respects. As the re-
course to the notion of conflicts law indicates, the approach assigns primacy to the reso-
lution of conflicts arising out of Europe’s diversity, rather than the establishment of a 
unitary legal regime. Equally important, the approach takes account of the ongoing con-
testation about the kind of polity which the integration process is to generate. This con-
testation is not different in principle from the ongoing domestic contests about the 
proper political order – with the important difference, however, that the law of constitu-
tional democracies provides a framework which channels political contestation, while, 
in contrast, the law of the integration process cannot build upon this type of legitimating 
framework. The modesty of the pragmatic ambitions which I have highlighted must not 
be understood as some complacent gesture. Quite to the contrary, we believe that the 
type of thinking and counter-visions which we seek to promote rests on quite solid 
grounds in the deeper structures of the European fabric. Its most widely-known refer-
ence point is the “unity in diversity” motto of the Draft Constitutional Treaty.11 Further 
precursors and allies can be named, such as Joseph Weiler’s juxtaposition of “Europe as 
unity” v. “Europe as community”,12 and Kalypso Nicolaïdes’ vision of a European 
“demoi-cracy”.13 All that is original about the conflicts-law approach is the plea for a 
resort to legal categories derived from conflict-of-laws traditions and conflict-of-laws 
methodologies in the legal re-construction of the “unity in diversity” challenge. 
What kind of validity can our plea for re-orientation claim? The binary right/wrong, 
legal/illegal, lawful/unlawful codes in which the legal system operates and to which 
lawyers appeal in their doctrinal argumentation cannot be relied upon our considerations 
without further ado. All of the important theories of legal integration have operated on 
horizons that cannot be reached directly by that code. They reflected the historical con-
text of the integration project, they sought to cope with the specifics and deficiencies of 
its institutional design – and, indeed, they continue with similar comprehensive reflec-
tions when addressing Europe’s present challenges. The conflicts-law approach situates 
itself on an equivalent conceptual level. Just like its interlocutors in the legal integration 
theory, it seeks to re-construct both the accomplishments of the integration project and 
                                                 
11  See note 1 supra. 
12  See Sections II.3 and III.2.3 infra. 
13  K. Nicolaïdis, “The new constitution as European ‘demoi-cracy’?” (2004) 7 Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 76-93. 
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its present impasses and crises; and to evaluate the pros and cons of the competing vi-
sions against such a background. It is of crucial importance to underline two limitations 
of this kind of exercise. It would, for one, be a misunderstanding to expect, from the re-
constructions of historical contexts and assumptions, that they would reveal “the true 
story” - a Leopold Rankan tale of “wie es wirklich gewesen ist”. What we seek to under-
stand is the meta-positive assumptions upon which legal conceptualisations of the inte-
gration project have relied, and from which they sought to derive normative guidance on 
their contributions to its operation. We will, then, necessarily, and thus deliberately, 
have to proceed selectively, albeit not arbitrarily. Our re-construction will depart from 
and be restricted to three schools of thought of long-term significance. Each of the three 
approaches has some fundamentum in re: each of them can claim to conceptualise im-
portant elements of Europe’s integration law, and each of them can provide normative 
reasons for its specific conceptualisation: the model of European rule (Sozialmodell) 
which it defends and promotes. It is a further characteristic of our re-construction that 
we take account of both the internal developments of each of these models and the con-
tinuous contestation among them, along with the ups and downs in terms of their practi-
cal impact. We will also argue, however, that all three have, notwithstanding their re-
markable viability, deficits in common, which exhaust their potential to cope with the 
present challenges that Europe faces. 
One common aspect of the three models can be stated negatively. They were per-
fectly aware of the discrepancy between the European and the national level of govern-
ance, and did not conceive of the European Economic Community as a constitutional 
democracy in being. What they have in common is a search for legitimate governance 
beyond nation-state confines and frames. Their messages on the modes of transnational 
governance, however, differ significantly: (1) “Europe should be institutionalised as a 
technocratic regime and be restricted to that function”. (2) “Europe’s vocation is the 
establishment of an ‘economic constitution’ which is to protect individual freedoms and 
to discipline the exercise of political power”; and (3) “Europe has accomplished and 
should preserve an equilibrium between a supranational legal order and ongoing politi-
cal bargaining”. We will, in this section, focus on the foundational period, underline a 
common deficit; the further development of the three approaches; and their potential to 
cope with the “transformations of Europe” will be addressed in a separate section (III). 
II.1.  Europe as Technocratic Administration: Hans Peter Ipsen and 
Ernst Forsthoff 
Hans Peter Ipsen was the influential founding father of European Law in Germany. He 
was a very remarkable protagonist of Germany’s legal scholarship. The Nazi period had 
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left him paraphrasing Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira,14 “not totally flawless” (nicht 
ganz fleckenlos). His post-war work on the Basic Law of the young German democracy, 
however, documents very clearly democratic commitments in general, and to the Sozial-
staatlichkeit of the new order in particular.15 He started to work on European law at the 
age of 50 – and helped to establish Europarecht as a new legal discipline.16 Precisely his 
democratic commitments may explain both: Ipsen’s sensitivity to the precarious legiti-
macy of the European system on the one hand, and the affinities between his own re-
sponse and the work of one of the most famous contemporary constitutionalist, namely, 
Ernst Forsthoff, on the other. These affinities are, at first sight, somewhat surprising in 
view of the differences in their constitutional theorising;17 they are, nevertheless, plausi-
ble in view of Ipsen’s search for a type of rule whose validity was not dependent on 
democratic legitimacy. The communities were to confine themselves to administer 
questions of “knowledge”, but to leave truly “political” questions to democratic and 
legitimated bodies.18 The characterisation of the European Communities as “Zweckver-
bände funktionaler Integration” (organisations with functionally-defined objectives)” 
was path-breaking. With this theory, Ipsen rejected both further-reaching federal inte-
gration notions and earlier interpretations of the community as a mere international or-
ganisation. He saw Community law as a tertium between (federal) state law and interna-
tional law, constituted by its “objective tasks” and adequately legitimised by their solu-
                                                 
14  H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, “An Anecdote, A Footnote”, in: H.-P. Mansel et al. (eds), Festschrift für Erik Jayme, 
(Munich: Sellier. European Law Publishers, 2004), pp. 387-402. Oliveira, writing in 1968, referred to Hans 
Dölle, from 1954 onwards one of the Directors of the Max-Planck Institute für ausländisches und internationals 
Privatrecht in Hamburg; on Ipsen, see Ch. Joerges, “Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of 
the Integration Project”, in: Ch. Joerges & N.S. Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow 
of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 
167-191, at 182-84 (note 92). 
15  Suffice it here to point to H.P. Ipsen, “Über das Grundgesetz” (1949), reprinted along with all of his 
later essays in idem, Über das Grundgesetz, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988), pp 1-37. 
16  See Hans Peter Ipsen, “Der deutsche Jurist und das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht”, in: Verhandlungen des 43. 
Deutschen Juristentages, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1964, vol. 2 L 14 et seq; idem, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1972), p. 176 et seq; very remarkable, in the present context, is his rejection of the idea 
of an economic constitution at both European and national level in his Gemeinschaftsrecht, pp. 563-566. 
17  See H.P. Ipsen, Über das Grundgesetz, note 15 supra, reprinted also in: E. Forsthoff (ed), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und 
Sozialstaatlichkeit, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), pp. 16-41, on the one hand, and E. 
Forsthoff, “Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaats”, in: (1954) 12 Veröffentlichungen der Vereininigung 
deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, pp. 8-36. 
18  “Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht”, (note 16 supra), p. 1045. 
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tion.19 This theory had an implicit answer to the queries about “the social” on offer. 
Ernst Forsthoff had, in his contribution to the so-called Sozialstaatskontroverse, argued 
that the realisation of social objectives had to operate outside the rule of law; the provi-
sion of welfare was, hence by virtue of the very nature of social policies, characterised 
as an administrative task, which was incompatible with the commitment to the 
Rechtsstaat (“rule of law”) in the Basic Law.20 This was not a principled objection 
against welfare policies. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive how the European 
Zweckverband (purposive administrative compound) with its transnational machinery 
might actively pursue the type of activities which welfare states administer domesti-
cally. In more principled terms, it seemed, at any rate, inconceivable that the type of a 
“hard” legal Sozialstaats-commitment, which Forsthoff’s opponents understood as a 
constitutive dimension of the Federal Republic’s democracy,21 could be institutionalised 
at European level. 
II.2.  Europe’s Economic Ordo: Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm 
The notion of the “social market economy” was formally introduced into Europe’s con-
stitutional parlance by a joint motion of Joschka Fischer and Domenique Villepin in the 
course of the debates on the Constitutional Treaty.22 Their initiative was meant to pla-
cate the anxieties over what was perceived as a neo-liberal tilt in the constitutional pro-
ject. The clause on the social market economy has fulfilled this function quite well in 
                                                 
19  See H.P. Ipsen, Verfassungsperspektiven der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), p. 
8 et seq., and the interpretation by M. Kaufmann, Europäische Integration und Demokratieprinzip, (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1997), p. 300 et seq., & 312 et seq; see, also, M. Bach, Die Bürokratisierung Europas. Verwal-
tungseliten, Experten und politische Legitimation in Europa, (Frankfurt aM: Campus, 1999), p. 38 et seq. 
20  Ernst Forsthoff, “Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtstaates”, note 17 supra. 
21  The so-called Sozialstaats-debate is an evergreen in German constitutionalism; for recent contributions, see O. 
Eberl, “Soziale Demokratie in Europa und zwischen Konstitutionalismus und Etatismus”, in: Andreas Fischer-
Lescano, Florian Rödl & Christoph Schmid (eds), Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisie-
rung sozialer Demokratie in Europa, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp. 245-256. A. Fischer-Lescano, “Europäi-
sche Rechtspolitik als transnationale Verfassungspolitik. Soziale Demokratie in der transnationalen Konstellati-
on“, ZERP Discussion Paper 2/2010, Bremen 2010, available at: http://www.zerp.uni-bremen.de//publicationen; 
Ch. Joerges, “Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration 
Process”, (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology, pp. 65-85. 
22  See the references in Ch. Joerges, “What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy”, 
(2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 461-489, at 486. 
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the general public debates, and in the constitutional discourses of both lawyers23 and 
political scientists.24 The vague notion of the “social” and simultaneously “competitive” 
market economy of the Convention and the Treaty of Lisbon is situated at a great dis-
tance from the original and fairly precise contours of Germany “sozialer 
Marktwirtschaft”.25 As the most important protagonist of the concept, Alfred Müller-
Armack, explained repeatedly, the social market economy was to provide a “third way” 
beyond economic liberalism on the one hand, and beyond socialism on the other. There 
was no conditioning of social justice by requirements of “competitiveness”; quite to the 
contrary, the governance of market mechanisms was subjected to the commands of so-
cial justice.26 
Müller-Armack and his political allies were keen to underline the compatibility of 
their vision with the Ordo-liberal School and the essential role assigned to economic 
freedoms and the protection of an undistorted system of competition by law and strong 
politically-independent enforcement authorities. The development of Ordo-liberalism as 
an economic theory and a vision of a political order started in the early 1920s as a 
counter-move against the strong cartelisation of the German economy and its corporatist 
links with a weak political system. The school survived National Socialism; it was per-
                                                 
23  See, for example, F.C. Mayer, “Die Rückkehr der Europäischen Verfassung? Ein Leitfaden zum Vertrag von 
Lissabon”, (2008) 68 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 1141-1217, at 1165 et seq. and the 
contributions to: U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen & L. Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law - 
From Rome to Lisbon, (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), and most prominently the German Constitutional 
Court’s judgment of 30 June 2008 on the Treaty of Lisbon. Bundesverfassungsgericht, file no.: 2 BvE 2 / 08, 2 
BvE 5 / 08, 2 BvR 1010 / 08, 2 BvR 1022 / 08, 2 BvR 1259 / 08 und 2 BvR 182 / 09, provisional English transla-
tion available at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, 
paras. 195 et seq., English translation at: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ 
es20090630_2bve000208.en.html. 
24  See, for example, U. Liebert, “Reconciling Social with Market Europe? The EU under the Lisbon Treaty”, in: 
Dagmar Schiek, Ulrike Liebert & Hildegard Schneider (eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism 
after the Treaty of Lisbon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2011), Chapter 2. 
25  See, on the following, Ph. Manow, “Modell Deutschland as an Interdenominational Compromise”, Minda De 
Gunzburg Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 003/2001; A. Ebner, “The intellectual foundations of the 
social market economy. Theory, policy, and implications for European integration”, (2006) 33 Journal of Eco-
nomic Studies, pp. 206-223. 
26  See the references in Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, “‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?”, in: Lars 
Magnusson & Bo Stråth (eds), A European Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future Policies in Historical 
Light. Preconditions for Future Policies from a Historical Perspective, (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 125-
158. 
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ceived as a German tradition which had not been contaminated by National Socialism 
and was therefore entitled to broad public recognition and influence. The details need 
not concern us here. However, noteworthy is, our concern for the social dimension of 
the European project, the initial compatibility of Ordo-liberalism and the model of the 
social market, and the dissolution of this alliance which was replaced by a new alliance 
between the second generation of Ordo-liberalism and Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism. 
The leading protagonists of the Freiburg School, the intellectual Heimat of Ger-
many’s post-war Ordo-liberalism in both economic and legal scholarship, namely, Wal-
ter Eucken and Franz Böhm, derived from the dual commitments to the idea of an “un-
distorted system of competition” on the one hand, and to the promise of social justice 
and security on the other, the challenging task of institutionalising specific, albeit inter-
dependent, orders, namely, a legally-structured order of industrial relations and of social 
security (“Arbeits- und Sozialverfassung”) along with the legally-guaranteed economic 
ordo: the structured “economic constitution” (Wirtschaftsverfassung), In this sense, the 
economic order which they envisaged was meant to be “socially embedded”. 
The “really existing social market economy”, however, had never been as coherently 
realised as their conceptual Vordenker would have liked to see. Even its economic core 
institution - its Wirtschaftsverfassung – was, by no means, a theoretically-uncontested 
and legally-consolidated project. The strongest practical challenge to the Freiburg style 
of Ordnungspolitik was the renaissance of Germany’s corporatist traditions already in 
the early years of the Bonn Republic. The Federal Republic was characterised by per-
manent tensions between Theorie und Praxis: striking discrepancies between the offi-
cious rhetoric of Ordnungspolitik, on the one hand, and the ongoing bargaining between 
the political system and the political and economic actors on the other - a German Le-
benslüge, to be sure, albeit an economically-successful and socially-beneficial arrange-
ment.27 The perception of this discrepancy will have influenced the (ordo)-liberal “turn 
to Europe”, which implied a retraction from their earlier more global political prefer-
ence.28 The European level of governance promised to ensure stronger barriers against 
the renaissance of Germany’s corporatist traditions and its political opportunism in 
economic affairs than the institutional pillars of Germany’s Ordnungspolitik. 
                                                 
27  Well-documented by W. Abelshauser, Die Langen F¨unfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 
1949–1966, (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1987). 
28 The scepticism and resistance of leading ordo-liberals has been re-constructed and explained in detail by M. 
Wegmann, Fruher Neoliberalismus und europaische Integration: Interdependenz der nationalen, supranationalen 
und internationalen Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1932–1965), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), in 
particular, p. 351 et seq., for the importance of the political and social constitution for the project of economic in-
tegration (pp. 359–366). 
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II.3.  Europe as Community: Joseph H.H. Weiler 
In his very first publication on European issues,29 Joseph Weiler presented a vision, 
which he substantiated and defended in his PhD-thesis,30 then retold, refined and com-
plemented in his seminal narrative on the “Transformation of Europe”:31 Europe has, in 
its foundational period, as Weiler argued, managed to establish an equilibrium between 
legal supranationalism and political intergovernmentalism. His portrayal of European 
integration was inspired by his teachers in international law on the one hand, and by the 
work of Erik Stein on the other; but it was path-breaking and unique in its doctrinal lu-
cidity and its sensitivity to the European synthesis of “the political” and the law. 
Weiler’s oeuvre is a powerful critique of the type of national state which Weber’s in-
augural address describes.32 Nowhere, however, did he talk about something akin to 
“social Europe”. Even in the concluding passages on democracy in Europe and the le-
gitimacy of the integration project of the “Transformations of Europe”, there is no men-
tion of the possibility that democracy might pre-suppose social justice and that Europe’s 
socially-defined legitimacy might erode through a destruction of welfare state traditions. 
And yet, even though Weiler’s value-laden work is characterised by a profound distance 
from the technocratic precepts and economic rationalisation of the European Commu-
nity, his visions seem surprisingly compatible with the benign neglect of the “social 
deficit” of the European order in European legal studies during the foundational period. 
To be sure, Weiler’s re-construction of Europe as a Janus-headed polity was not meant 
as a conceptualisation which would exclude Europe’s engagement in social issues as a 
matter of (legal) principle. However, due to the Realpolitik of his analysis, „social Eu-
rope“ was an unlikely option and only of limited significance, anyway. It was highly 
unlikely simply because its advent was dependent on unanimous inter-governmental 
voting; it was, by the same token, of little concern as the later tensions between the in-
tegrationist objective and the legacy of European welfarism were still dormant. 
II.4.  Three Concluding Observations 
As an interim summary, we can put on record an ambivalent legacy of the foundational 
period. On its bright side, we note the turning away from the Weberian nation state; less 
                                                 
29  J.H.H. Weiler, “The Community system: the dual character of supranationalism”, (1981) 1 Yearbook of European 
Law, pp. 257–306. 
30  Idem, Il sistema comunitario europeo : struttura giuridica e processo politico, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985). 
31  Idem, “The Transformation of Europe”, (1990–91) 100 Yale Law Journal, pp. 2403–2485. 
32  See the thorough analysis by D. Gaus, “Legitimate Political Rule without a State? An analysis of Joseph H.H. 
Weiler’s justification of the legitimacy of the European Union qua non-statehood”, RECON Online Working pa-
per 2008/12, available at: www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html. 
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fortunate, however, was the benign neglect of the welfarist commitments of West Euro-
pean democracies. Both aspects deserve some further comments. 
II.4.1 The Taming of Weber’s National State 
The designers of the EEC-Treaty were both realistic and wise enough to understand that 
the darker legacy of the European political and economic nationalism would not fade 
away with the end of the war. Their objectives, however, were institutionalised pru-
dently. The three foundational theories which we have sketched out have understood 
these messages and integrated them into their conceptualisation of the European project: 
no discrimination on grounds of nationality, no resorting to the political power of the 
state as an instrument of parochial economic advantage, and common economic free-
doms in the pursuit of economic prosperity – this was the lesson Europe seemed to have 
learned. 
II.4.2  The Neglect of the Welfare State Legacy of European Democracies 
We have defined the second communality of the early legal-integration theories nega-
tively. It is more troubling, because the institutionalisation of welfare commitments 
could be, and has been, in fact, widely understood as a “second pillar” of Europe’s de-
mocratic conversion, a societal shield providing protection against a rebirth of the social 
anxieties which nationalist movements had instrumentalised. Why is it, we are both in-
clined and entitled to ask, that precisely the welfare state traditions of European democ-
racies are not visible in the legal theories of European integration? Why does it need 
historians such as Alan Milward33 and Tony Judt34 to remind Europe’s legal academia 
that welfare traditions are what Europeans do have in common and what distinguishes 
their collective memories from that of American citizens? Why does it need politicalsci-
entists like Fritz W. Scharpf35 and Giandomenico Majone36 to remind European constitu-
                                                 
33  A. Milward, The Rescue of the European Nation-State, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 21 et seq. 
34  T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 791 et seq.; idem, 
Ill Fares the Land, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), pp 127- 237 and passim. 
35  See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity”, 
(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 645-670, at 645-646, and, recently, “The Asymmetry of Euro-
pean Integration or why the EU cannot be a ‘Social Market Economy’”. 
36  Europe as he Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), p. 128 et seq. Majone is well aware, however, of the 
foundational moment; see his classic Regulating Europe, (London-New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 1: “At the end 
of the period of reconstruction of the national economies shattered by the war income redistribution and discre-
tionary macroeconomic management emerged as the top policy priorities of most Western European govern-
ments…” 
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tionalists, albeit in very different perspectives, of the structural asymmetries in their 
constitutional visions? How can a scholar of the format and sensitivity of Joseph 
Weiler, in his seminal narrative on the “Transformation of Europe”,37 fail to address the 
issue of “social Europe”, and, even in his comment on the Treaty of Maastricht, contin-
ues to present “prosperity” as Europe’s second value without ever relating it to social 
justice. What he offers instead is quite in line with his appeal to “Community”, a some-
what metaphorical uploading of the notion of “prosperity” with a “solidarity” dimen-
sion: a soft power, which he expects to control “the demonic at the statal economic 
level”.38 Is it by chance that, in European constitutionalism, it took primarily labour 
lawyers to remind us of the importance of “the social” for democratic constitutional-
ism?39 
The omission of a “social dimension” in the conceptualisation of the European pro-
ject does not seem like a surprising omission, as a downright failure. During the founda-
tional period, welfare state policies and practices were, of course, controversial in many 
respects, but they were understood as national affairs. Only with hindsight have the 
implications and effects of this constellation become so clearly visible. Stefano Giub-
boni, who has carefully re-constructed both the mindset of the “founding fathers” and 
the political bargaining over the Treaty of Rome, concludes that we have to understand 
this outcome not as a mere failure, but as a “historical compromise”.40 The parties to this 
compromise are said to have trusted in the wisdom of eminent economists who expected 
very positive effects from an opening of national Volkswirtschaften;41 they may also 
have trusted in the sustainability of a constellation which eminent political scientists 
were to characterise as a politically and socially “embedded liberalism”.42 Such positive 
                                                 
37  Note 31 supra, see, in particular, p. 2476 et seq. 
38  See J.H.H. Weiler, “Fin-de-Siècle Europe” in: R. Dehousse (ed), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Un-
ion, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 203-216, at 208 et seq. 
39  See B. Bercusson, “Social policy at the Crossroads: European labour law after Maastricht”, in: R. Dehousse (ed), 
note 38 supra, pp 149-186; S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedoms in the European Constitution. A 
Labour Law Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); B. Bercusson, S. Deakin, P. Koisti-
nen, Y. Kravaritou, U. Mückenberger & A. Supiot, “A Manifesto for Social Europe”, (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal, pp. 189-205. 
40  Ibid., p. 7. 
41  See, most notably, the “Ohlin Report”: International Labour Organisation, “Social Aspects of European Eco-
nomic Co-operation. Report by a Group of Experts”, in (1956) 74 International Labour Review, pp. 99-123. 
42  J.G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order”, (1982) 36 International Organization, pp. 375-415; see J. Steffek, Embedded Liberalism and its Critics: 
Justifying Global Governance in the American Century, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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expectations seem well compatible with the stringent transnational regulation of the 
agricultural sector where such interventionism has been held to be indispensable. Legal 
scholarship, however, treated this socially extremely-important and economically ex-
tremely-costly domain as an “exception” in the European edifice, which did not deserve, 
and did not, in fact, attract, closer academic scrutiny for a very long time to come.43 
II.4.3  Historical Indeterminacy and the Indispensability of Theory in Legal 
Argumentation 
The differences in the re-construction of the foundational constellation between the in-
stitutional generalists in European legal scholarship on the one hand, and a later genera-
tion of labour law constitutionalists on the other, are quite illuminating: Brian Bercus-
son, writing under the impression of the Treaty of Maastricht, put all his hopes on the 
“outstanding importance” of what was accomplished therein.44 Stefano Giubboni, writ-
ing a decade later,45 complemented the projection of positive signals in European devel-
opment in his comments on the later Treaty amendments and on the (Draft) Constitu-
tional Treaty;46 in addition, he started to seek legally-relevant backing for his views of 
the “compromise” which he read into the Treaty of Rome: 
“[T]he apparent flimsiness of the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome (and of the 
slightly less meagre ones of the Treaty of Paris, was in reality consistent with the inten-
tion, imbued with the embedded liberalism compromise, not only preserve but hopefully 
to expand and strengthen the Member States’ powers of economic intervention and so-
cial governance: i.e., their ability to keep the promise of protection underlying the new 
social contract signed by their own citizens at the end of the war.”47 
Lasciate ogni speranza is, instead, the main message of Florian Rödl,48 writing in the 
                                                 
43  Until F. Snyder, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985); for a comprehen-
sive recent analysis, see K. Zurek, “European Food Regulation after Enlargement: Should Europe’s Modes of 
Regulation Provide for more Flexibility”, Ph.D Thesis EUI Florence 2010 (Chapter III). 
44  Ibid., note 39 supra, p. 183. 
45  S. Giubboni, Diritti Sociali e Mercato. La Dimensione Sociale dell’Integrazione Europea, (Bologna: Il Molino, 
2003); English version: Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law Perspec-
tive, note 39 supra. 
46  Giubboni, Social Rights, note 39 supra, pp. 94-150. 
47  Ibid., p. 16. 
48  F. Rödl, “Labour Constitution”, in: A. v. Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 605-640; very similar, see L. Niglia, “Form and Substance in European 
Constitutional law: The ‘Social’ Character of Indirect Effect”, (2010) 16 European law Journal, pp. 439-457. 
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wake of Viking and Laval, as far as the actual development of the Union is concerned. 
He renews, however, the defence of “Social Europe” by the re-construction of the foun-
dational constellation as a legally significant “compromise”. It seems, indeed, plausible 
to argue that the premises of the negotiators and their understanding of the EEC Treaty 
should be taken into account in the interpretation of Treaty provisions such as Article 
153 (5) TFEU (ex-Article 137 (5)), which stipulates that “the provisions of this Article 
shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose 
lock-out”.49 The legal surplus of such suggestions seems minimal, however, and is a 
shaky ground for far-reaching conclusions as to the Union’s social commitments. The 
Treaty of Rome has mentioned significant social fields in its Title III of Part Three, and 
Member States were, as Article 118 EEC Treaty confirms, expected to co-operate 
closely. It is also true that distributional and income polices were foreseen in an impor-
tant part of the European Economy, namely, agriculture. Agustín José Menéndez50 reads 
these provisions as strong elements of a federal structure foreshadowing the strengthen-
ing of the federalisation of Europe, whereas, in Giandomenico Majone’s view,51 they 
confirm that the social-policy domain was “considered to be outside the competence of 
the supranational institutions”.52 Both of these readings are based upon the same histori-
cal evidence. Both of them can claim to be valid – but they need to base their claims 
upon re-constructions which are informed by non-historical theoretical premises. 
What we can more safely assume is simply that the negotiators operated on the as-
sumption of same kind of “embedded liberalism” and its sustainability, so that the pro-
tagonists of welfare policies could live with the compromise. If such expectations are 
proved to be wrong, legal reasoning must not assume that conclusive normative argu-
ments can be derived from “historical facts”; it must, instead, engage in conceptual de-
liberations and controversies. It must also become aware of the non-historical normative 
and analytical issues underlying historical re-constructions such as those we have just 
mentioned. These issues are complex and sensitive: Does democratic governance, as a 
matter of principle, require that the objectives of social justice can be pursued by the 
political system? If so, is it at all conceivable that welfare policies can be successfully 
institutionalised at European level, or do in view of the diversity of socio-economic 
conditions, political traditions and preference rather promise to preserve their variety? 
                                                 
49  On the doctrinal controversies on this provision, see Section V.3.2. infra. 
50  “United they diverge? From conflicts to constitutional theory? Critical remarks on Joerges’ theory of conflicts of 
law”, this volume. 
51  Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, note 10 supra, p. 131 et seq. 
52  Ibid., p. 132. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 148) 
- 17 - 
III.  HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT 
We started this chapter by listing some enormous challenges which Europe is facing 
today. The “social deficit”, which we have traced back to the institutional design of the 
Treaty of Rome, is just one of them, albeit one of particular importance in view of the 
collateral damage in terms of the social acceptance of the Union and the growing risks 
of populism and xenophobia. The social deficit furthermore illustrates particularly dras-
tically the impasses of European politics, which result from the reliance of the integra-
tion project on the so-called Community Method. We will - in the first step of this sec-
tion - illustrate these difficulties briefly before we take up the discussion of the three 
legal conceptualisations of the integration project again. The development of these con-
ceptualisations mirrors the practical impasses of European politics, as we will argue. 
However, it is important not to misunderstand the exercise that we are undertaking as 
some fundamental critique, not even as a further characterisation of Europe as a “falter-
ing project”.53 Instead, its objective is to pave the way for a paradigm shift which would 
defend the Union’s accomplishments, and simultaneously open new perspectives. 
III.1.  Fragile Pillars of “Social Europe” 
The story of Social Europe has much in common with Michael Ende’s most famous 
fairy tale.54 Every move in the process of economic integration was accompanied by 
counter-moves towards a social re-imbedding of the European polity. However, these 
counter-moves did not merely occur through the conferral of new competences to the 
Community in treaty amendments and subsequent legislative arenas. The ECJ, in par-
ticular through its anti-discrimination jurisprudence, operated as a progressive instiga-
tor, and the reference procedure was often enough prudently and successfully used by 
labour law networks.55 However, most of the changes were piece-meal without compre-
hensive long-term background agenda. 
Social aspirations were more explicitly articulated in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The contours of what was to constitute Europe’s “social dimension”, how-
ever, remained vague. Key concepts from national welfare states appeared in official 
documents without an equivalent institutional background. This held true for Germany’s 
“soziale Marktwirtschaft”,56 for France’s “services publiques”,57 and T.H. Marshall’s 
                                                 
53  See J. Habermas, “European Politics at an Impasse. A Plea for a Policy of Graduated Integration” in: idem, 
Europe: The Faltering Project, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 78-106. 
54  Michael Ende, The Neverending Story, (Die unendliche Geschichte) (New York: Penguin Books, 1983). 
55  See S. Sciarra, (ed), Labour Law in the Courts. National Judges and the European Court of Justice, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001). 
56  See references above in notes 25, 26 & 35. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 148) 
- 18 - 
notion of “social rights”.58 The only transnational European innovation was the “Open 
Method of Co-ordination” (OMC) which the Lisbon Council of 2000 brought to bear in 
new areas of social policy.59 Even Fritz W. Scharpf initially suggested that this alterna-
tive to the traditional community method “could hold considerable promise”.60 Sophisti-
cated theorists were persuaded by the prospect of a seemingly democratic “learning 
through monitoring”.61 This initial enthusiasm was to fade away with the rather modest 
accomplishments of the Treaty of Lisbon, so many ambivalent or inconclusive practical 
experiences62, and, the recent dis-embedding moves in the labour law jurisprudence of 
the ECJ. 63 
III.2.  The Foresight of Theory: Three Retractions 
The rejection of all the constitutional ambitions in the Treaty of Lisbon and the present 
impasses of the integration praxis (practise) are also observable in the legal integration 
theory. Tellingly enough, this holds true for all of the three conceptualisations that we 
have sketched out above. This observation seems the more significant, as these three 
models – technocratic rule, economic rationality, and the community vision – were not 
chosen at random. They represent - quite comprehensively - the evolutionary options 
                                                                                                                                               
57  See the comparative account in M. Krajewski, Grundstrukturen des Rechts öffentlicher Dienstleistungen, (Hei-
delberg: Springer, 2010), p. 55 et seq.; for the European level, see U. Neergard, “Services of General (Economic) 
Interest: What Goals and Values Count?”, in: U. Neergard et al., note 23 supra, pp. 191-225. 
58  T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class”, in: idem, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (Westport 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 65-122. 
59  See for an analysis of the legal meaning of coordination powers by Beate Braams, “Die Kompetenzordnung im 
Vertrag von Lissabon”, in: Ingolf Pernice (ed), Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Reform der EU ohne Verfassung?, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 115-134.  
60  See F.W. Scharpf, “European Governance: Common Concerns vs. The Challenge of Diversity”, in: Christian 
Joerges, Yves Mény & J.H.H. Weiler (eds), “Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission 
White Paper on Governance”, EUI Florence/NYU Law School 2002, pp. 1-12, at 9, available at:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/OnlineSymposia/Governance.shtml. 
61  Ch.F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
European Union”, (2008) 14 European Law Journal, pp. 271-327. 
62  For a recent comprehensive evaluation oin legal theory perspectives, see M. Dawson, New Governance and the 
Proceduralisation of European Law: The Case of the Open Method of Coordination, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 2011), for an analysis in social theory perspectives, see Poul F. Kjaer, Between 
Governing and Governance: On the Emergence, Function and Form of Europe’s Post-national Con-
stellation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
63  See Section V.2 infra. 
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among which the integration project could choose and kept oscillating. All of them have 
been continuously present since the foundational period. They have been developing, 
even mutating, within their particular perspectives, be it in their responses to changing 
contexts, or be it through mutual observation and political learning. We can neither try 
to document the continuities and innovations within each tradition, nor discuss the af-
finities between them in any detail. It is sufficient, for our argument, to characterise 
crucial transformations within each of them – and to underline telling parallels in their 
diagnosis of the current impasses. 
III.2.1 Technocracy without Efficiency: Majone’s Critical Turn  
The importance of the technocratic tradition in the praxis (practise) of the integration 
project can hardly be over-estimated. Its weight was bound to increase with the in-
volvement of the European Community in ever more regulatory policies which were to 
be organised at transnational levels without the backing of a consolidated democratic 
order. How else than through an “objective” and expertise-based conceptualisation of its 
enormous tasks could the European Community hope to ensure the acceptance of its 
involvement in ever more problem-solving activities? The by far most interesting and 
influential work which renewed and refined the technocratic legacy is that of Gian-
domenico Majone.64 It is unique not only in its clarity and coherence, but also in its re-
flections of the options for an alternative to the democratic constitutionalism of the 
Member States of the European Union. Majone’s famous conceptualisation of Europe 
as a “regulatory State”65 which operates essentially through non-majoritarian institutions 
was conceived as ensuring the credibility of commitments to what were, in principle, 
uncontested policy objectives. Welfare policies pose additional problems. The Union’s 
failure to institutionalise a comprehensive social policy results partly from the “reluc-
tance of the Member States to surrender control of a politically salient and popular area 
of public policy”; equally important is the factual difficulty and political impossibility 
of replacing the variety of European welfare state models and traditions with some inte-
grated European scheme.66 Not only does Majone respect the primacy of constitutional 
                                                 
64  Who confronted Europe’s integration studies right upon his return to Europe with essays like “Regulating 
Europe: Problems and Prospects”, (1989) 3 Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft, pp. 159-177; 
“Cross-national resources of regulatory policymaking in Europe and the United States”, (1991) 11 Journal of 
Public Policy, pp. 79-106 and kept working on the perspectives outlined therein ever since (see, most recently, 
his Europe as the Would-be word power, (note 10 supra). 
65  G. Majone, “The European Community as a Regulatory State”, 1994-V/1 Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, (The Hague-Boston MA-London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), pp. 321-419. 
66  Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), p. 144. 
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democracies, he also, and with increasing urgency, underlines the fallacy of an ever 
more perfect and comprehensive subjection of the integration project to its “operational 
code”, the principle “that integration has priority over all competing values”,67 and also 
the camouflage strategies which he calls “integration by stealth”.68 This is an alarming 
retraction from his earlier trust in the problem-solving potential of the European project. 
However, his warnings do, by no means, reflect a change of theoretical premises. Ma-
jone continues to underline that Europe is not legitimated to pursue the type of distribu-
tional politics which welfare states have institutionalised.69 He does not retract his plea 
for regulatory efficiency. His critical turn is, instead, motivated by the inefficiencies 
which he observes in the Union’s operations. His quest for more modesty in Europe’s 
ambitions (“Geht’s nicht eine Nummer kleiner?” [Can we not lower our sights])70 sum-
marises these observations. His adaptation of the “unity in diversity” formula71 is an 
implication of these insights to which we will return in Section IV. 
III.2.2 What is Left of the Economic Constitution: Ordo-liberal Concerns 
The institutionalisation of economic rationality is most widely perceived today, either 
affirmatively or critically, as Europe’s main agenda.72 This perception has gained 
prominence since the legendary White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Mar-
ket.73 At that stage of the integration process, the ordo-liberal tradition had experienced 
a deep transformation. That mutation had started at national level with the move of 
Friedrich von Hayek from Chicago to Freiburg and his promotion of version of neo-
liberalism situated between the Freiburg School’s orthodoxy on the one hand, and the 
Chicago School’s normative complaceny on the other. Von Hayek’s notion of “compe-
                                                 
67  Ibid., p. 1. 
68  See his Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
69  Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), p. 128 et seq. 
70  Ibid., p. 170 et seq. 
71  Ibid., p. 205 et seq. 
72  See, on the one hand, the contributions on European economic law in A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (note 48 supra) 
by A. Haltje (“The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market), pp. 589-629, and J. Drexl (“Competition 
Law as Part of the European Constitution“), pp. 659-679, which are strongly indebted to the ordo-liberal tradition, 
and M. Höpner & A. Schäfer (2010): “A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capitalisms in Post-
Ricardian Europe”, (2010) 33 West European Politics, pp. 344-368, on the other. Such theoretical controversies 
vary, of course, as strongly as Europe’s varieties of capitalism. 
73  European Commission, “White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the Internal Market”, COM (85) 
310 final, 14 June 1985. 
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tition as a discovery process” captures the essence of his messages best. They have led 
the second generation of ordo-liberal scholars to re-define the objectives and the meth-
ods of national and European competition law. Attention shifted from the control of 
economic power to the protection of entrepreneurial freedom and the critique of anti-
competitive regulation. What happened in the 1970s had been not anticipated, but was 
analysed with an amazing precision a good number of years ago by Michel Foucault in 
the course of the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France.74 There, Foucault char-
acterised the ordo-liberal vision of the strong state which is committed to the protection 
of the competitive ordering of the market as new type of governmentalité, namely, the 
acceptance of market governance by the political system and the whole of society.75 
There are remarkable affinities between the second generation Ordo-liberalism and the 
Chicago school when it comes to practical issues of competition law and policy, but 
they have never led to a real merger of the two schools. The heirs of Eucken and von 
Hayek did not subscribe to the Chicago understanding of economic output efficiency 
and “consumer welfare” but continued to define and defend the “system of undistorted 
competition” as the core of Europe’s “economic constitution”.76 They witnessed, how-
ever, a steady decline in the impact of their visions, which became clearly visible in the 
substantial broadening of European economic policies in the Treaty of Maastricht,77 the 
so-called “modernisation” of European competition law,78 and the move towards a 
“more economic approach”.79 The weakening of their ideational power was symboli-
                                                 
74  M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France, (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2004), espe-
cially the lesson of 7 February 1979 pp. 105-134, and the lesson of 14 February 1979, pp. 135-164. 
75  Idem, “… [A]u lieu d’accepter une liberté du marché, définie par l’État et maintenue en quelque sorte sur surveil-
lance étatique… eh bien, disent les ordolibéraux, il faut entièrement retourner la formule et se donner la liberté du 
marché comme principe organisateur et régulateur de l’État…Autrement dit, un État sous surveillance du marché 
plutôt qu’un marché sous surveillance de l’État”, Biopolitique (note 7), Lesson 5, p. 120. 
76  See E.-J. Mestmäcker, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union. Beiträge zu Recht, Theorie und 
Politik der europäischen Integration, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), with a collection of essays written from 
1965 to 2001 and his recent critique of E. Posner in: A legal theory without law: Posner v. Hayek on Economic 
Analysis of Law, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), also available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1168422. 
77  See M.E. Streit & W. Mussler, “The Economic Constitution of the European Community. From ‘Rome’ to 
‘Maastricht’”, (1995) 1 European Law Journal, pp. 5-30. 
78  H. Schweitzer, “Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship: The Example of 
Art. 81” (December 1, 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092883. 
79  See D. Schmidtchen, M. Albert & Stefan Voigt (eds), The More Economic Approach to European Competition 
Law, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
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cally confirmed when French Prime Minister Sarkozy saw to it that the Union’s com-
mitment to “a system ensuring that competition is not distorted” was not included in 
Article 3 TFEU (ex-Article 2 TEU), but moved back into Protocol 27 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon.80 
III.2.3 Unity without Community: J.H.H. Weiler’s Constitutional Complacency 
Joseph Weiler’s early work can, in hindsight, be identified as being truly path-breaking 
in that it synthesised, in a novel way, Europe’s constitutive historical move towards a 
common peaceful future, the construction of a supranational legal alternative to the role 
of international law in the system, while remaining aware of the political embeddedness 
and dependency of these accomplishments. The great normative perspectives and the 
sensitive realism in his design of equilibrium between “legal supranationalism” and 
“political intergovernmentalism”, however, gradually became even more apparent as 
Weiler sought to develop his construct and vision further in the light of European ex-
periences, accomplishments and failures. In his seminal article on the “Transformation 
of Europe”, he delivered an insightful diagnosis of the problematical implications of 
majority-voting in terms of Europe’s legitimacy.81 He was among the first to realise the 
normative and political ambivalences of the completion of the Internal Market by the 
Delors Commission: 
“[T]o regard the Community as a technological instrument is, in the first place, to un-
der-estimate the profound political choice and cultural impact which the single market 
involves – a politics of efficiency, a culture of market.”82 
We can summarise the forgoing observations in a second interim conclusion: the im-
passes of the integration praxis are mirrored and foreshadowed by the exhaustion of the 
main theoretical perspectives which have accompanied and oriented legal reflections, 
theoretical conceptualistions and the prescriptive modelling of Europe’s finalité. Where 
practice and theory concur that significantly in their retroactive moves, the time for re-
considering an alternative paradigm seems to be right.  
                                                 
80  Legally speaking, the removal looks insignificant, as, for example, Peter Behrens has underlined: “Der Wettbew-
erb im Vertrag von Lissabon”, (2008) 21 Europaische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, p. 193; the Law’s 
truth, however, is not the whole truth. 
81  Weiler, “The Transformations of Europe”, note 31 supra, p. 2461 et seq. 
82  Weiler, “Fin-de-Siècle Europe”, note 38 supra, p. 215. 
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IV.  EUROPE’S LEGITIMACY PROBLEM REVISITED: THE CONFLICTS-
LAW ALTERNATIVE 
Europe’s “operational code” is to prioritise integration “over all other conceivable val-
ues including democracy”.83 “Unity in diversity”, the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, 
has become Majone’s new leitmotiv.84 The legal form of this motto is the re-
conceptualisation of European law as a new type of supranational conflicts law. That 
approach, however, seeks to open much broader perspectives than Majone envisages in 
his plea for political modesty. Rather than repeating this argument once more,85 com-
mentary is restricted here to a depiction of its five core messages.86 
IV.1.  Conflicts Law as Democratic Commandment 
The entire construction is built upon a sociological observation with normative implica-
tions. Under the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation, contemporary societies 
experience an ever stronger schism between decision-makers and those who are im-
pacted by decision-making. This schism is explained by Niklas Luhmann within his 
sociological risk theory. According to Luhmann, the problem arises because decision-
making on risks is always characterised by the fact that the potential damage is not sim-
ply borne by individual decision-makers, nor is it only suffered by the persons profiting 
from the decision.87 Luhmann’s sociological observation is normatively disquieting in 
democratic orders. Suffice it here to point to Jürgen Habermas’ first essay on European 
integration,88 which he published prior to the completion of his discourse theory of law 
                                                 
83  Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, note 10 supra, p. 1. 
84  Ibid., p. 205 et seq. 
85  For early versions, see Ch. Joerges, “The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process and as a 
Contest of Legal Disciplines - an Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts”, (1995) 3 
European Review of Private Law, pp. 175-192; “The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reduction-
ist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective”, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 
378-406; “Deliberative Supranationalism” – A Defence”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP); 5 (2001) 
No. 8, available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-008a.htm. 
86  In the following, I draw on “Integration through Conflicts Law: On the Defence of the European Project by 
means of alternative conceptualisation of legal constitutionalisation”, in: Rainer Nickel (ed), Conflict of Laws and 
Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond – Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification, (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2010), pp. 377-400. 
87  N. Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991); colourfully and laconically summarised 
in, for example, idem, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995), pp. 141-143. 
88  J. Habermas, Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität, (Citizenship and National Identity), (Zurich: Erkner, 
1991). 
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and democracy,89 and later elaborated in greater detail:90 increasingly, constitutional 
states are unable to guarantee the inclusion of all of those persons who are impacted 
upon by their policies and politics within their internal decision-making processes. The 
democratic notion of self-legislation, however, which postulates that the addressees of a 
law should be able to understand themselves as its authors, demands “the inclusion of 
the other”. 
IV.2.  The Supranationality of European Conflicts Law 
This plea for a new understanding of EU law must not serve as a retraction from supra-
nationalism as such, the connotations of its terminological origin notwithstanding. Quite 
to the contrary, it furnishes a justification for the validity of the supranational jurisdic-
tion – albeit one which is, just like the three models of legal integration theory discussed 
above,91 at the same time depicting the limits of supranational rule. To rephrase its so-
ciological and normative basis slightly: as a consequence of their manifold degree of 
inter-dependence, the Member States of the European Community/Union are no longer 
in a position to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of their policies. A European law 
that concerns itself with the amelioration of such external effects, i.e., which seeks to 
compensate for the failings of national democracies, may induce its legitimacy from this 
compensatory function. With this, European law can, at last, free itself from the critique 
that has accompanied it since its birth; a critique that states that it is not legitimate. It 
can thus operate to strengthen democracy within a contractual understanding of state-
hood, without needing to establish itself as a democratic state.92 
                                                 
89  J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), see Annex III therein, also  in, 
idem, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, (Cambridge MA: 
The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 491-516. 
90  J. Habermas, “The European Nation State: On the Past and the Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship”, in: idem, 
The Inclusion of the Other, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 105-128. 
91  Sections II.1-3 and III.2. 
92  The argument has been taken up or reinvented repeatedly: see, for example, R. Howse, & K. Nicolaïdis, “Democ-
racy without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics”, in: T. Broude & Y. Shany (eds), The Shifting 
Allocation of Authority in International Law. Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2008), 163-191; K.-H. Ladeur, “The State in International Law”, in: Ch. Joerges & J. Falke 
(eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), It has also provoked critique, in particular, by A. Somek, “The Argument from Transnational Effects I: 
Representing Outsiders Through Freedom of Movement”, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, pp. 315-344; “The 
Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy”, (2010) 16 European Law 
Journal, pp. 375-394. It will become apparent from our exemplary discussion in Sections V and VI that, in our 
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IV.3.  Convergence, Re-construction, Critique 
Clearly, such a democratic exoneration of European law is only plausible to the exact 
degree that it may be re-constructed within this perspective, or that it may be furnished 
with a conflicts-law orientation. This, however, is already often enough the case: Euro-
pean law has given legal force to principles and rules which serve the purpose of supra-
national “recognition” – the non-discrimination principle, the supranational definition 
and the demarcation of legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for justification for 
actions that are imposed upon national legal systems, and the proportionality principle – 
which supplies a legal yardstick against which respect for supranationally-guaranteed 
freedoms may be measured. All these principles and rules may be understood as a con-
cretisation of a supranational conflicts law, which guarantees that the actions of the 
Member States are reconcilable with their position within the Community. This is not to 
say, however, that the solutions to the conflicts at which European law has actually ar-
rived, are always convincing. Our re-construction of European law in the normative 
perspectives just outlined will reveal tensions between “facticity” and “validity”, as well 
as failures and missed opportunities – the conflicts approach shares this type of experi-
ence with the three approaches which it seeks to replace. 
                                                                                                                                               
understanding, Part I of Somek’s argument fails to acknowledge the conflicts-law framework of the argument, 
which is “emebedded” in the Habermasian notion of the “co-originality” of private and public autonomy; the 
whole point of the conflicts approach is about the defence of co-originality against the supremacy of “economic 
freedoms” (see Section V.1 infra and the references in note 102); Part II of the argument seeks to take the inter-
dependence problématique too lightly. As F. Rödl has recently out it: “The border-crossing interdependence of 
national societies generates types of problems that can no longer be solved by the States on their own or through 
their consensual cooperation, but require a unitary political space that corresponds to the continental or even 
global scope of the problems” (“Democratic Juridification without Statization: Law of Conflict of Laws instead 
of a World State”, Ms. Frankfurt/Main 2010; on file with the author). To argue that the conflicts approach con-
ceptualises the interdependence problem adequately is not to suggest, however, that it would generate good an-
swers to all true conflicts – see Section IV 2.3 infra. Also, to refer to Habermas is not to suggest that the dis-
course theory of law has a privileged access to a query which is raised by others, lawyers and political theorists 
alike, in similar ways; see N. Nic Shuibhne, “The Resilience of market citizenship”, forthcoming in Com-
mon Market Law Review, and R. Bellamy, “The liberty of the post-moderns? Market and civic freedom within 
the EU”, LEQS paper No. 01/2009, available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/ 
LEQS/LEQSPapers.aspx. 
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IV.4.  The Internal Differentiation of Conflicts Law within Europe’s 
Multi-level System: the Idea of a Three–dimensional Conflicts Law 
The metaphor of the multi-level system asserts that European “rule” cannot be organ-
ised hierarchically. This argument is reflected not only within the apportionment of 
competences within the EU but also by the fact that vast discrepancies exist in the op-
erational resources available at each ruling level. Accordingly, we are able to distin-
guish between three forms of legal collision – vertical, “diagonal”, and horizontal. Di-
agonal collisions are an important and unique feature of multi-level systems. They are a 
constant feature of life within the EU, since the competences required for problem-
solving are, at times, to be found at the level of the EU itself, and, at other times, at the 
level of the Member States. This division of competences gives rise to two forms of 
potential conflict – on the one hand, between divergent EU and national political orien-
tations, and, on the other, between divergent interest constellations in the Member 
States – with the result that very particular mediation arrangements must be identified. 
This need for mediation is true for all multi-level systems, but is particularly pressing in 
the case of the EU, where the existence of diagonal conflict has had, as its corollary, the 
evolution of a particularly intense degree of administrative co-operation, the institution-
alisation of advice-giving instances, and the systematic construction of non-
governmental co-operative relationships. This infrastructure may be understood as fur-
nishing the integral components of a conflicts law, a law that may no longer restrict it-
self to the individual adjudication of situational cases of conflict, and which must, in-
stead, constantly busy itself with the finding of general solutions to universal problems. 
At the same time, such conflicts law must be - methodologically and organisationally - 
open to evolution, which has seen the development of post-interventionist regulatory 
practices and legal forms within national law. Accordingly, we may identify three types 
of European conflicts law, which operate in three dimensions:93 conflicts law of the 
“first order” is flanked, on the one hand, by a conflicts law which, most specifically in 
the realm of European comitology, has concerned itself with the elaboration of material 
                                                 
93  See, for more detail, Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, “Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts II: Die kollisionsrechtli-
che Form einer legitimen Verfassung der post-nationalen Konstellation”, in: Gralf-Peter Calliess et al. (eds), So-
ziologische Jurisprudenz: Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009, 
pp. 765-778; Ch. Joerges, “The Idea of a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form”, in: Ch. Jo-
erges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic 
Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming; also available at: www.reconproject.eu/ 
projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html. For similar terminological usage, though built upon a dif-
ferent conceptual base, Poul F. Kjaer, “Three-dimensional Conflict of Laws in Europe”, ZERP-DP 2/2009, avail-
able at: http://www.zerp.uni-bremen.de/; see, also, Poul F. Kjaer, note 62 supra, p. 141 et seq. 
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(substantive) regulatory options, and, on the other hand, by a conflicts law which gov-
erns the supervision of para-legal law and self-regulatory organisation. 
IV.5.  Conflicts Law as Proceduralising Constitutionalism 
It follows from the preceding sections that it would be factually and normatively mis-
taken to regard European law as a system of law dedicated to the incremental construc-
tion of a comprehensive legal edifice. Europe must, at last, take the motto of the draft 
constitutional treaty94 to heart, and learn to accept the fact that its diversity will accom-
pany it far into the future, so that conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise 
the process of European integration. It must further concede that this “process” should 
be overseen by a conflicts law, which, by virtue of its identification of the principles and 
rules that govern conflict, will generate the law of the European multi-level system. 
Europeanisation is not simply a process of change; it is also a learning process. Law 
cannot pre-determine the substance of such processes, but may yet secure its own nor-
mative character, by virtue of its self-dedication to the processes of law-making/legal-
justification (Recht-Fertigung), which mirror and defend the justice and fairness within 
law.95 This understanding is by no means simply some Teutonic idiosyncrasy.96 It is, for 
example, akin to Antje Wiener’s notion of “the invisible constitution”,97 or Deirdre Cur-
tin’s concept of the “living constitution”.98 Should it be that these daring ideas are realis-
tic in the sense that they represent the only conceivable type of responses to the chal-
lenges to which the European project is exposed? In his comments on the conflicts-law 
approach, Andrea Greppi has identified these difficulties with radical clarity.99 The pro-
ceduralisation of law risks foregoing all substance, in particular, a commitment to social 
justice. Its openness and its plea for deliberative problem-solving risks are seized by the 
                                                 
94  Article I-8 Draft European Constitutional Treaty (note 1 supra). The formula was dispensed with by the Lisbon 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
95  See R. Wiehölter, “Just-ifications of a Law of Society”, in: O. Perez & G. Teubner, (eds), Paradoxes and Incon-
sistencies in the Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 65-77, available at: http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/ifawz1/teubner/RWTexte/justum.pdf. 
96  See M. Everson & J. Eisner, The Making of the EU Constitution: Judges and Lawyers Beyond Constitu-
tive Power, (Milton Park: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), in particular, p. 41 et seq. 
97  A. Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
98  D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
99  Andrea Greppi, “Procedure and substance in postnational constitutionalism: ¿Montesquieu or Sieyes?”, Chapter 7 
in this volume. 
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logic of technocratic managerialism. To summarise these concerns and hopes in a cita-
tion: 
“Whether intentionally or unintentionally, legal theory and philosophy suggest that they 
contain a remedial potential which in fact they lack, and necessarily must lack, to the 
extent that they fail to incorporate the inchoate values of individuals and institutions in 
society, the phenomenon Ernst Cassirer called the ‘constitution that is written in the 
citizens’ minds’.”100 
V.  THE DEEPENING OF EUROPE’S LEGITIMACY PROBLEM BY THE 
ECJ’S LABOUR LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
As indicated, the conflicts-law approach is not meant as an artificial juxtaposition to 
positive European law, but it does claim to take up the legacy of legal realism, and, 
hence, to articulate the “real life” of the law. This, however, is by no means a purely 
affirmative exercise. Both of the case studies in the following sections will use the ap-
proach to raise objections or to articulate reservations against important decisions of the 
ECJ. 
V.1. The Example of Cassis de Dijon 
The conflicts-law approach advocates mitigation between controversies over diverging 
policies and complex interest configurations. With this aspiration, the approach departs 
markedly from the traditional treatment of public law provisions in private international 
law, international public and administrative law. Europe has, as Jona Israël put it, the 
chance and vocation to transform the comitas (voluntary and diplomatic co-ordination) 
among its states and societies into a legally-binding commitment to co-operative prob-
lem-solving.101 This has been accomplished in countless cases - more or less convinc-
ingly. The ECJ’s legendary Cassis de Dijon judgment of 1979102 may serve to illustrate 
this point. The ECJ’s response to the controversy between Germany and France over 
Germany’s prescriptions on a minimum percentage of alcohol in liquor was as plausible 
as it was trifling: the confusion of German consumers could be avoided, and a reason-
able degree of protection against erroneous decisions by German consumers could be 
                                                 
100  V. Grosswald Curran, “Law’s Past and Europe’s Future”, (2005) 6 German Law Journal, pp. 483-512, at 486, 
available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com. The reference is to E. Cassirer’s posthumously published The 
Myth of the State, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 91. 
101  J. Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation, (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), pp. 123, 150-152, 
& 323-334. 
102  Case 120/78, ECR [1979] 649. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 148) 
- 29 - 
achieved by simply disclosing the lower alcohol content of the competing French li-
queur. 
Damian Chalmers and Agustín José Menéndez have raised objections of different 
weight. As Chalmers rightly underlines, the “centre of gravity” of the case was in Ger-
many and concerned conflicts of interest between a German distributor (REWE) and 
German liquor producers.103 This is the fact, but it does not affect the involvement of the 
ECJ in a conflict constellation which is within the European multi-level system. 
Chalmers’ critique touches upon the upgrading of economic freedoms to constitutional 
rights which entitle those affected to the supervision of national legislation by the ECJ. 
This move of the ECJ was anything but trivial, because the Court has assumed en pas-
sant the constitutional functions. This kind of power is inherent in any supranational 
supervision of national public law. Its constitutional sensitivity control becomes appar-
ent when we re-construct the issue within the framework of the discourse theory of law. 
Economic freedoms belong to the sphere of private autonomy and deserve recognition 
as constitutional rights. However, within consolidated constitutional democracies, the 
recognition of the constitutional status of the private sphere is complemented by the 
constitutional recognition and protection of political rights. Both spheres must be under-
stood in the conceptualisation of Jürgen Habermas as “co-original”.104 The issue, then, is 
of whether the ECJ has gone a step too far when complementing the recognition of the 
constitutional status of the economic freedoms by its authoritative definition of the kind 
of concerns which are deemed to be compatible with the establishment of a common 
European market. It is this latter query to which Menéndez refers in his critique of the 
constitutional ambitions of the conflicts-law approach.105 This point is well taken,106 but 
                                                 
103   “Deliberative Supranationalism and the Reterritorialization of Authority”, in: B. Kohler-Koch & B. Rittberger 
(eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy, (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 329-343, at 334. 
104  J. Habermas has developed this notion in the context of his theory of democratic constitutionalism; see his Be-
tween Facts and Norms (note 89 supra), p. 118 et seq. Very convincingly, in my view, Rainer Nickel and Florian 
Rödl have suggested its application “beyond the state”: see R Nickel, “Private and Public Autonomy Revisited: 
Jürgen Habermas’ Concept of Co-Originality in Times of Globalisation and the Militant Security State”, in: Mar-
tin Loughlin & Neil Walker (ed), The Paradox of Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
147-167; F. Rödl, “Private Law Beyond the Democratic Order? On the Legitimatory Problem of Private Law 
‘Beyond the State’”, (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 743-768. 
105  See A.J. Menéndez, “When the market is political: The socio-economic constitution of the European Union be-
tween market-making and polity-making”, in: R. Letelier & A.J. Menéndez (eds), The Sinews of Peace. Reconsti-
tuting the Democratic Legitimacy of the Socio-Economic Constitution of the European Union, Oslo: ARENA, pp. 
39-62 (RECON Report 10, available at:  
http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECONreport0910.pdf?fileitem=29736964), more recently his 
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it does in no way affect the reading of Cassis as a conflicts law case. The ECJ handed 
down a ruling on a complex conflict constellation, a ruling which provides a legal 
framework for this conflict. This “is” conflicts law, albeit not necessarily good law.107 
V.2.  A Market Community? The ECJ’s Recent Labour Law 
Jurisprudence 
The much-debated recent labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ provides a line of cases in 
point. It is difficult for anybody aware of continental private and public international 
law or Anglo-Saxon conflict of laws not to realise the discrepancies between the latter 
disciplines and the decisions which the ECJ has handed down under European law. This 
is not, in itself, deplorable. What deserves closer scrutiny, however, is the content of the 
principles and rules which the ECJ has invoked and developed in its responses to the 
conflict constellations which were referred to it. 
V.2.1  Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
These three cases are, by now, so well-known that it should suffice here to summarise 
their contents very briefly. 
The first case was decided on 11 December 2007.108 Finnish seafarers, employed on 
the ferry Rosella, become aware of the intention of their employer to flag out to Estonia. 
Since they were afraid of losing their jobs or being forced to accept lower wages, they 
tried to impress their employer by threatening to strike. This was legal under Finnish 
                                                                                                                                               
“United they Diverge? From Conflict of Laws to Constitutional Theory? On Christian Joerges’ Theory, RECON 
WP 2011/06, Oslo 2011. 
106  See, a good while ago, E. Steindorff, “Probleme des Art. 30 EWG”, (1984) 148 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Han-
delsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 338-355. 
107  There is no space in this lengthy essay to review related approaches which share this insight. G. Conway’s Ph.D 
Thesis on “Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” 
(Brunel 2010), however, deserves exceptional treatment [see, also, his “Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU 
Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ”, (2010) 11 German Law Journal, pp. 966-1005, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1280]. With his notion of “conflict of norms”, 
Conway has chosen a term which, very fortunately, avoids connotations and confusion which the “conflicts law” 
approach tends to provoke. Conway also does not engage extensively in constitutional deliberations. It is all the 
more remarkable and enlightening that his analyses documents – the avoidance of the term by the ECJ notwith-
standing (see page 185, note 333) – the omnipresence of conflicts and the need for legal responses in all spheres 
of the law of the EU. 
108  Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP, OÜ 
Viking Line Eesti, judgment of 11 December 2007, [2007] ECR I-10779. 
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law. But, as their Finnish employer argued, such action was incompatible with Viking’s 
right of free establishment as enshrined in Article 43 EC. 
The response of the ECJ is conciliatory in its tone, but is, in fact, quite rigid. The ECJ 
starts out by underlining that the “right to take collective action, including the right to 
strike … [is] a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles 
of Community law”.109 Then, however, the Court fundamentally re-configures the tradi-
tional balance between economic freedoms at European level and social rights at na-
tional level, explaining that the Member States, although “still free, in principle, to lay 
down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of the rights in ques-
tion…must nevertheless comply with Community law […]. Consequently, the fact that 
Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to strike or to the right to impose lock-outs is 
not such as to exclude collective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
from the application of Article 43 EC”. 
The second case was decided only one week later.110 Laval, a company incorporated 
under Latvian law, had won the tender for a school building on the outskirts of Stock-
holm. In obtaining the tender, it had profited from the differences in the wage levels of 
Latvia and Sweden. In May 2004, when work was to start, and after Laval had posted 
several dozens of its workers, the Swedish trade unions resorted to hostile actions 
against Laval with such determination and intensity that Laval gave up. 
The Unions had acted legally according to Swedish law, but the Court referred to Di-
rective 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services.111 
This Directive requires, with respect to a number of essential working conditions, 
that foreign workers are not to be disadvantaged. According to Article 3, workers are to 
be guaranteed the minimum rates of pay. According to the general principle of the same 
Article, the rates of pay must be laid down either “by law, regulation or administrative 
provision” or “by collective agreements which have been declared universally applica-
ble within the meaning of paragraph 8”. Sweden, however, had refrained from changing 
its pertinent laws, but had, instead, relied on the exceptions listed in Article 3 Paragraph 
8 (providing therein the absence of a system for declaring collective agreements or arbi-
tration awards universally applicable. It left the determination of wage levels to collec-
                                                 
109  Case C-438/05 (Viking), para 44. 
110  Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbun-
det, avd. 1, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, judgment of 18 December 2007, [2007] ECR I-11767. 
111  Directive 96/71/EC OJ 1996, L18/1. 
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tive agreements concluded among the undertakings themselves. The Court argued that, 
in this respect, Sweden was in breach of (secondary) Community law.112 
In the third judgment, which was handed down on April 2008, the ECJ further en-
trenched its position.113 Rüffert concerned the legality of a tender proffered by one of the 
German Länder (federal states), Lower Saxony, which contained a clause indicating that 
the public authorities were bound to respect existing collective-bargaining agreements, 
so that tendering firms would also be required to abide by the relevant collective-
bargaining agreements. The ECJ held that Lower Saxony’s legislation was irreconcil-
able with Article 49 EC, since it prevented foreign service-providers from benefiting 
from lower wage costs within their country of origin. 
The vital point within the judgment is its evaluation of the protective purpose of the 
clause committing the public authorities to respect collective agreements: in this respect, 
the Court held that: 
“Contrary to the contentions of Land Niedersachsen and a number of the Governments, 
such a measure cannot be considered to be justified by the objective of ensuring the 
protection of workers.” 
This finding is all the more remarkable in view of a prior pertinent decision of Ger-
many’s Constitutional Court, which had explained only in 2006:114 
“The combating of unemployment, together with measures that secure the financial sta-
bility of the social security system, are particularly important goals, for the realisation 
of which the legislator must be given a relatively large degree of decisional discretion, 
and especially so under current, politically very difficult, labour market conditions.”115 
V.2.2  Dissenting Opinions in Luxembourg and their Disregard 
In all of the three cases, the Court’s Advocate Generals – Poiares Maduro in Viking, 
Mengozzi in Laval, Bot in Rüffert – had submitted Opinions which differed, more or 
less significantly, from the Court’s later judgments. In two more recent cases, the sig-
nals of dissent were becoming stronger and more articulate. 
                                                 
112  See paras. 70-71 of the judgment. 
113  Case C-346/06, Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, Judgment of 3 April 2008, European Court reports [2008] ECR I-
01989. 
114  Bundesverfassungsgericht, - 1 BvL 4/00 - (First senate, 16 July 2006), available at the Court’s website at: 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20060711_1bvl000400.html. 
115  Para. 103 (translation by the author; references to earlier judgments omitted). 
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The first case concerns the applicability of Directive 2004/18 on a German pension 
scheme for public employees, and has considerable affinities with Rüffert.116 The Ger-
man scheme foresaw the involvement of Trade Unions in the transformation of parts of 
their remuneration into pensions (“Entgeltumwandlung”). The European Commission 
found the involvement of the trade unions in the selection of insurers to be compatible 
with the Directive. 
The opinion which AG Verica Trstenjak delivered on 14 April 2010 does not directly 
question the Court’s labour law jurisprudence.117 She explicitly refrains from supporting 
Germany’s quest for “Albany exclusion”,118 and confirms the applicability of the eco-
nomic freedoms. She then adds, however, that the social right to collective-bargaining 
and the freedoms are of equal weight and invokes the principle of proportionality as a 
guide for its resolution.119 The conflict is to be resolved at the level of primary law and 
this resolution has then to guide the interpretation of secondary legislation. This leads 
her to question the validity of the Commission’s reading of the said directive and to 
suggest that the complaint be dismissed.120 
The second case concerns the compatibility of Belgian requirements relating to the 
posting of workers in Belgium with the Posted Workers Directive.121 It is, in this re-
spect, closer to Laval. GA Cruz Villalón, in his opinion of 5 May 2010, characterises 
this directive as a response to the conflicts between the social values and the economic 
freedoms which the internal market is bound to generate,122 and then complements the 
argument of his Slovenian colleague by a reference to Articles 9 and 3 TFEU, suggest-
ing that, under Treaty of Lisbon, social protection is no longer to be understood as an 
exception from the economic freedoms, but as commitment of general validity. Like his 
colleague, he then invokes the proportionality principle to resolve these tensions.123 
The two opinions move the conflict between economic freedoms and social rights to 
the European level and thereby strengthen Europe’s judicial supranationalism. The 
premises and implications of this projection are difficult to understand. Both cases con-
cern policy fields in which national law has not been replaced, but is only partially af-
                                                 
116  Case C-271/08, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany. 
117  See, in particular, para. 196 et seq., on the Rüffert case. 
118  See her discussion of Case C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-5751 in para. 54 et seq. 
119  See paras. 186 et seq. 
120  See para. 237. 
121  Case C-515/08, Vítor Manuel dos Santos Palhota and Others. The judgment of the ECJ case dates from 7 Octo-
ber 2010. 
122  Para 38. 
123  Para. 52 et seq. 
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fected by European prerogatives. The prospects for a clarification of such queries, how-
ever, do not seem bright. In its judgement of 15 July 2010, the ECJ (Grand Chamber) 
rather flatly rephrased what had been stated in Viking and Laval: 
“[W]hile it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys in Germany the constitu-
tional protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) of the German Basic Law upon 
the right to form associations to safeguard and promote working and economic condi-
tions, the fact remains that, as provided in Article 28 of the Charter, that right must be 
exercised in accordance with European Union law. 
Exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore be reconciled 
with the requirements stemming from the freedoms protected by the FEU Treaty, which 
in the present instance Directives 92/50 and 2004/18 are intended to implement, and be 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality.”124 
V.3.  The Conflicts-law Alternative 
What is wrong with all this? Here is no space to comment on the European wide discus-
sion of this jurisprudence. The following remarks will be restricted to some aspects, 
which illuminate the specifics of the conflicts-law approach. 
V.3.1  Sweden’s Social Democratic Sonderweg 
Patricia Mindus125 has, after her review of social and legal integration theories, turned to 
a dimension of the Laval case which she is extremely well-equipped to take up in such 
sophistication: the Laval litigation does, indeed, illustrate aspects of “the Swedish Son-
derweg” such as the legal status and social function of kollektivavtalssystemet which the 
Swedish legislature did not dare to touch when implementing the Posted Workers Di-
rective. She argues very convincingly that the “Swedish model” is, by now, politically 
contested, and not only under pressure exerted by some “kleptomaniac competence ex-
tension” of the ECJ. In a conflicts-law language, Sweden has to become aware of the 
tensions between its Sonderweg and its European commitments. The Union and its 
highest Court must defend these commitments which are, at the same time, Community 
                                                 
124   CaseC-271/08, paras. 43-44. In Case C-515/08 (note 119), the ECJ has handed down its judgment of the ECJ on 
7 October 2010. The Court confirmed that “overriding reasons relating to the public interest capable of justifying 
a restriction on the freedom to provide services include the protection of workers” and “recognised that the Mem-
ber States have the power to verify compliance with the national and European Union provisions” (paras. 47-48) 
without mentioning the TFEU and the Charter. In their proportionality analysis of the Belgian legislation, the AG 
and the ECJ concurred. 
125  P. Mindus, “Theorising Conflicts and Politicisation in the EU”, this volume, Chapter 6. 
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entitlements. They must also be aware of the instrumentalisation of European law and 
court proceedings in internal Swedish power battles126 – the Laval case was, after all, 
initiated and financed in Sweden.127 This is an instructive explanation of the background 
and the implication of Laval. Simultaneously, it is also an instructive illustration of the 
conflict patterns which the Europeanisation process generates. This observation con-
firms the assertion that European law “is” conflicts law. But is Laval “good conflicts 
law”? The constellation is structurally the same as in Cassis de Dijon,128 but so much 
more dramatic. The message of the conflicts-law approach is seemingly abstract: the 
law should civilise the contest over divergent policies and interests without assuming 
the mandate to streamline Europe’s diversity. 
V.3.2  Prudence of Conflicts Laws 
“Judicial restraint” versus “judicial activism” is a misleading dichotomy here, and does 
not exhaust the potential of the traditions on which the conflicts-law approach builds at 
all. 
Antoine Lyon-Caen, the doyen of French labour law, has, without resorting to the 
conflict of law or private international law terminology, recalled one core message: 
“Dans les sociétés d’Europe de l’Ouest, le droit du travail s’est constitué par émanci-
pation du droit du marché, dénommé moyennant les variations terminologiques qu’il 
importe de ne pas oublier: liberté du commerce ici, freedom of trade ailleurs… Ce n’est 
pas que des règles sur le travail n’existaient pas avant cette émancipation, mais elles 
relevaient d’avantage d’une police du travail, partie plus ou moins autonome d’une po-
lice du ou des marchés.”129 
                                                 
126  P. Mindus, text accompanying note 35 et seq. 
127  Battle is going on in Swedish politics, legislation and jurisprudence. In a judgment of 2 December 2009, the 
Swedish Arbetsdomstolen imposed “exemplary damages” on the trade unions which had taken action against La-
val. See the annotation by Norbert Reich, “Laval ‘Vierter Akt’”, (2010) 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirt-
schaftsrecht, pp. 21-22. 
128  See Section V.1 supra. 
129  “In West European societies Labour Law as was constituted as an alternative to the law of the market. It devel-
oped terminological distinctions which one must not disregard… liberteé de commerce here, freedom of trade 
there… To be sure, legislation relating to work had been in place prior to that emancipatory move, but pertinent 
rules were meant to controlling work in a way which was more or less distinct from the laws policing the market 
or markets in general” (translation by the author); thus A. Lyon-Caen, “Droit communautaire du marché v.s. 
Europe sociale.” Contribution to the Symposium on “The Impact of the Case Law of the ECJ upon the Labour 
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There is a categorical difference between economic law and labour law, Lyon-Caen 
argues. The most basic notion which conflicts law has at its disposal is “characterisa-
tion”130 and, Ernst Rabel’s universalist visions notwithstanding, characterisation has, 
according to the prevailing view, to take the views of the forum seriously. The categori-
cal difference is not written in stone and not pre-given as some transpositive ordo, but 
deeply rooted, albeit in a variety of forms, in the history of industrial and democratised 
societies. 
Parallelism in European law is the principle of enumerated competences. However, 
awareness of this parallelism is no longer widespread among European law scholars, 
which is unfortunate because the sensitivity of the elder discipline for the specifics of 
legal fields provides some guidance in the interpretation of such opaque provisions as 
Article 137 (5) EC (now Article 153 (5) TFEU).131 
The prudence suggested by conflicts law coincides with what we have noted in our 
references to the discourse theory of law and democracy.132 What the ECJ did in the 
perspective of this theory was to disregard the autonomy and co-originality of private 
and political autonomy, and to assign supremacy to economic freedoms over political 
citizenship. The conflicts-law approach does, of course, claim to have delivered an 
elaborated re-construction of this inter-dependence at European level. Its understanding 
of the constitutionalisation strongly suggests, however, to respect the variety in 
Europe’s social models and to promote their co-ordination in the light of practical ex-
periences. It seems perfectly justified to further the efforts of the new Member States to 
exploit their competitive advantages. It is by no means plausible that “direct wage com-
petition”133 would signal solidarity with these countries, and further both the prosperity 
within, and distributional justice among, Europe’s diverse regions. It may be that, 
through the opening of the Western Markets for cheap labour, we foreclose the chances 
for the accession states to build up their own social model. Should we really assume that 
                                                                                                                                               
Law of the Member States”, Berlin 26 June 2008, organised by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
available at: http://www.bmas.de/portal/27028/2008__07__16__symposium__eugh__lyon-caen.html. 
130  E. Rabel, “Das Problem der Qualifikation”, (1931) 5 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals 
Privatrecht, pp. 241-288. 
131  See A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast, “The Federal Order of Competences”, in: idem, Principles, note 48 supra, pp. 
275-307, at 294, note 144; but see also, for example, G. Conway, “Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU”, note 
107 supra, Chapter 5.6, p. 285 et seq. 
132  See notes 92 and 102 supra. 
133  See F. Rödl, “Transnationale Lohnkonkurrenz: ein neuer Eckpfeiler der ‘sozialen’ Union?”, in: A. Fischer-
Lescano et al., (eds), Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in 
Europa, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp. 145-160. 
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the Swedish employer organisations seek to give a hand to the development of Estonia 
by the kind of strategies they pursued with Laval and the financing of the lengthy litiga-
tion in that case? European law should know more about the social price to be paid for 
the bringing of cheap labour to Old Europe before engaging in the flattening of 
Europe’s diversity.134 
“Restraint” versus “activism” is not the proper frame for these issues. The type of 
prudence which the conflicts-law approach requires is at least as demanding as, albeit 
not identical with, what we expect from the constitutional courts of consolidated nation 
states or federations in their supervision of legislation. To this issue, however, we will 
have to return. 
VI.  CONFLICTS LAW OR COMMUNITY METHOD? RESPONSES TO UPPER 
AUSTRIA’S CONCERNS WITH ATOMIC ENERGY 
The protection of the “health and life of humans, animals and plants” was mentioned as 
a legitimate regulatory concern in Article 36 EEC Treaty and complemented by the rec-
ognition of environmental protection as a matter of “general interest” in the aftermath of 
Cassis de Dijon. Environmental issues are, indeed, the best conceivable case for the 
theoretical and normative core of the conflicts-law approach. Nowhere is it more evi-
dent that national decision-making has external effects, and that those affected in an-
other territory are regularly excluded from domestic decision-making processes. No-
where does it seem more plausible to establish a transnational regime with the potential 
to correct such failures. Last, environmental issues are often enough of such political 
sensitivity that it makes sense to insist on the kind of horizontally-inclusive constitu-
tionalism which the conflicts law advocates. 
European law and pertinent theoretical conceptualisations had beenfor a long time, 
far from respecting such insights. The unanimity rule governed in environmental poli-
cies. Political scientists provided us with the distinction of product and process regula-
tion which seemed to rationalise the autonomy of national preference-building. How-
ever, since Maastricht, environmental protection has become a commitment of constitu-
tional dignity – and has retained this status ever since.135 
It should, hence, be easy to provide plausible evidence militating in favour of our 
claim that the conflicts-law approach is not something external to the integration pro-
ject, but a dimension which can be re-constructed in Europe’s political and legal devel-
                                                 
134  Tellingly enough, in the US, nobody seems to doubt that, in cases in which an enterprise from a poorer and 
lower-wage state brings its workers to a higher-wage, more generous state, the latter’s higher labour standards 
apply to those workers. Communication from Professor Cynthia Estlund, NYU Law School. 
135  See Article 11 TFEU. 
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opment. However, the discussion here will be restricted to one troubling example of 
particular sensitivity, namely, the litigation over the Temelín nuclear power plant, be-
tween its operator ČEZ, a power-supply undertaking in the Czech Republic, and the 
Austrian Land of Oberösterreich, the owner of a piece of land located at a distance of 
just 60 km from Temelín. The Temelín saga began in the 1980s long before the Czech 
Republic became a member of the European Union.136 
The Temelín nuclear power plant was built close to the Austrian border and author-
ised by Czechoslovakian authorities back in 1985. The Austrians were concerned about 
its technological standards from the very beginning. In the enlargement process, three 
similar power plants were closed down while Temelín was modernised by Westing-
house, an American company. The Austrian position must be understood in the context 
of its own principled rejection of atomic energy. This took legal shape in the At-
omsperrgersetz (“Anti Zwentenforf-Gesetz”) (statute on the prohibition of atomic en-
ergy) of 1978, then in the Bundesverfassungsgesetz für ein atomfreies Österreich (fed-
eral constitutional law on an Austria free of atomic energy) of 1999. Intergovernmental 
negotiations, in which the European Commission became involved, continued. This led 
to the “Melk Protocol” of 2000, an agreement signed by the Austrian and the Czech 
government, and to the “Brussels Agreement” of 2001, which substantiated the follow-
up of the Melk Protocol. Jörg Haider profited from the Austrian sentiments through a 
referendum which sought to make the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU de-
pendent upon the closure of Temelín137 
While the political conflict was not settled, the Temelín plant, modernised according 
to EU standards, went into operation at full capacity in 2003. The Austrian opponents 
turned to law for help. 
VI.1.  Case C-343/04: Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ 
They had done so throughout the whole history of Temelín and explored, always in 
vain, the potential, first, of international law, then of European law. Now they turned to 
what was left, namely, private law. The protection offered by Austrian private law is 
twofold: an owner of land can, by the actio negatoria of § 364 (2) ABGB, prohibit 
damaging interference beyond “the normal local level”.138 This is what the Province of 
                                                 
136  For a detailed and instructive account ending, however, in 2007 see W. Hummer, “Temelín: Das Kraftwerk an 
der Grenze”, (2008) 62 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, pp. 501-557. 
137  The populist move had a very remarkable resonce. In Upper Austria, Haider obtained support of 23.5b %; see 
Hummer, ibid., p. 526. 
138  That provisions reads:  (2) Der Eigenthümer eines Grundstückes kann dem Nachbarn die von dessen Grund aus-
gehenden Einwirkungen durch Abwässer, Rauch, Wärme, Geruch, Geräusch, Erschütterung und ähnliche inso-
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Upper Austria argued against the Czech power-supply undertaking (ČEZ) as the owner 
of the land located in the North of Oberösterreich, which is used for agricultural pur-
poses including trials relating to plant cultivation, and is also home to an agricultural 
college. What the complaint held to be beyond “the normal local level” was the ionising 
radiation emanating from the plant and crossing the border into Austria. But is Austrian 
law at all applicable? Do Austrian Courts have jurisdiction, and, if so, will their judg-
ments be enforceable in the Czech Republic? These issues bring us to the pertinent rules 
of private international law and the jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention 
of 1968. 
AG Poiares Maduro, in his opinion of 11 January 2006, and the ECJ, in its judgment 
of 18 May 2006,139 accordingly asked: Are there rights in rem at issue here, so that the 
Austrian courts could claim exclusive jurisdiction as provided under Article 16 of the 
Convention? Or, is this matter, to be qualified as a tort in the sense of Article 5 III, gov-
erned by the lex loci delicti instead? (“the place where the harmful event occurred”). 
The answer given by the ECJ to the questions so framed sounds plausible: 
“... it cannot be considered that an action such as that pending before the national 
court should in general be decided according to the rules of one State rather than the 
other and in conclusion: this is no case of exclusive Austrian in rem jurisdiction.”140 
Plausible as it sounds, one remains puzzled: if Austrian standards must not govern, is 
the consequence that the defendant can operate the plant according to the standards of 
the Czech Republic without regard for the Austrian concerns? This would constitute a 
democracy failure of the type described above.141 AG Poiares Maduro, in one of his 
scholarly opinions, was, however, digging deeper: the courts of both interested states 
should be able to claim exclusive jurisdiction for the analysis of the statutory restric-
tions on ownership over immovable property located in their respective territories.142 
This, however, implies the risk of conflicting judgments.143 “In such cases, the judgment 
                                                                                                                                               
weit untersagen, als sie das nach den örtlichen Verhältnissen gewöhnliche Maß überschreiten und die ortsübliche 
Benutzung des Grundstückes wesentlich beeiträchtigen. Unmittelbare Zuleitung ist ohne besonderen Rechtstitel 
unter allen Umständen unzulässig“ (“The owner of land may prohibit his neighbour from producing effects, ema-
nating from the latter’s land, by effluent, smoke, gases, heat, odours, noise, vibration and the like, in so far as they 
exceed normal local levels and significantly interfere with the usual use of the land. Direct transmission, without 
a specific legal right, is unlawful in all circumstances.” 
139  [2006] ECR I-04557. 
140  Case C-343/04, para. 36. 
141  Section IV.1. 
142  Para. 90. 
143  Para. 91. 
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to be delivered must pay special attention to the transnational character of the situa-
tion.”144 This may sound a bit sibylline, but it does, in fact, indicate the need for a con-
flicts-law response: 
“If the national legal system allows the protection of property either through a property 
rule or a liability rule, the transnational dimension of the case and the possible diffi-
culty of making a full cost-benefit analysis may be relevant to such a choice. Secondly, 
the same concern for the consideration of the transnational character of the situation 
may be relevant in seeking a balance of all relevant elements with respect to the as-
sessment of the amount of damage or the assessment of the risk that such damage may 
occur.”145 
The ECJ took a more comfortable way out, explaining merely that Austria cannot claim 
exclusive jurisdiction. However, this was only a preliminary end of the saga’s first 
chapter. 
VI.2.  Case C-115/08: Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ a.s. 
The Czech Republic and Austria returned to negotiating. Finally, both states “declared 
that they would fulfil the series of bilateral obligations, including safety measures, 
monitoring free movement rights and the development of energy partnerships, set out in 
a document known as ‘The Conclusions of the Melk Process and Follow-Up’, which 
was concluded in November 2001”.146 
VI.2.1 The Shadow of Weber over Austria’s Oberster Gerichtshof? 
But this agreement did not stop Upper Austria from pursuing its complaint further. In 
April 2006, they obtained a judgment from the Oberster Gerichtshof, which was based 
upon the exception from § 364 (2) adopted in § 364a. This provision reads: 
“However, if the interference is caused, in excess of that level, by a mining installation 
or an officially authorised installation on the neighbouring land, the landowner is enti-
tled only to bring court proceedings for compensation for the damage caused, even 
where the damage is caused by circumstances which were not taken into account in the 
official authorisation process.” 
The Austrian Court’s judgment is as traditional as it is interesting in the reasons stated 
for the refusal to recognise the authorisation of the Czech plant. Such authorisations, the 
                                                 
144  Para. 93. 
145  AG Maduro in Case C-342/04, para. 95. 
146  AG Maduro, ibid., para. 3; ECJ (note 136), paras. 43 et seq. 
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Court explained, have to weigh conflicting considerations and interests. This weighing, 
however, occurred in a foreign jurisdiction, and, hence, there was “no reason why Aus-
trian law should restrict the property rights of Austrian landowners purely in the inter-
ests of protecting a foreign economy and public interests in another country”.147 This can 
be read as a tribute to the political nature of decisions on high-risk activities and the 
need for a democratic basis for such decisions. A blatant refusal of Austrian courts to 
recognise the legitimacy of foreign authorisation would be irreconcilable with the trans-
formation of pure comity among European nations into legal commitments among the 
Member States.148 Unsurprisingly, both the ECJ and its Advocate General concurred in 
their conclusions. The delicacy of the case, however, stems from the constitutional 
background of the Austrian refusal to recognise the Czech authorisation. It was not a 
discretionary balancing of economic interests and of risks to health and the environ-
ment, but the principled rejection of atomic energy by a constitutional amendment 
which was the foundation for the Austrian Higher Court’s refusal to respect the foreign 
administrative act.149 Neither the Court nor the AG addressed acknowledged this objec-
tion. They differed, however, significantly and illuminatingly, in the reasoning upon 
which they based their findings. 
VI.2.2 Administrative Supranationalism in the ECJ’s Grand Chamber? 
When confronted with the differences between Austria and the Czech Republic, the ECJ 
started to search for a resolution at a higher legal level. This search, however, did not 
lead to conclusive results. True, the EAEC Treaty of 1957, in its Title II, contains “pro-
visions designed to encourage progress in the field of nuclear energy”. However, neither 
this treaty, nor any other provision of European law grants the competence “to authorise 
the construction or operation of nuclear installations”.150 All that Articles 30-31 EAEC 
provide for are procedures for the co-ordination of national standards for the protection 
of human and animal life from ionising radiation.151 The gap between these articles re-
mains puzzling – and the way out of this dilemma which the ECJ took is troubling: it 
would be discriminatory, as the ECJ explains, to subject a nuclear power plant situated 
in the territory of another Member State to an injunction in a case in which the foreign 
undertaking is in possession of the necessary official authorisations. What follows sub-
stantiates this reasoning: 
                                                 
147  Thus the report at para. 51 of the judgment in Case C-115/08, [2009] ECR I-10265. 
148  See J. Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation, note 101 above.  
149  See the summary of the Austrian reasoning reported in para. 56. 
150  Para. 103. 
151  See paras. 111 et seq. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 148) 
- 42 - 
“It is for the national court to give, in so far as possible, to the domestic legislation 
which it must apply an interpretation which complies with the requirements of Commu-
nity law. In the last instance, however, the national court is bound to protect the rights 
which Community law confers on individuals.”152 
VI.2.3 AG Poiares Maduro’s Flirt with Conflicts Law 
The opinion which AG Maduro delivered to the Court on 22 April 2009 sounds more 
elegant: 
“This case may be characterised as one which turns on the question of reciprocal ex-
ternalities. On the one side, Austria and, in particular, the Land Oberösterreich believe 
they are victims of an externality imposed on them by ČEZ and the Czech authorities in 
installing a nuclear power plant next to the Austrian border without taking into account 
the risks imposed on those living on the other side of the border. On the other side, ČEZ 
and the Czech Republic argue that it is the interpretation of Austrian law made by the 
Austrian Supreme Court that imposes on them an externality by requiring them to close 
the Czech nuclear power plant simply to protect the interests of Austrian citizens and 
without taking into account the situation in the Czech Republic.”153 
It is not only the diagnosis, but also the suggested therapy which, at first sight, seems to 
be in line with the conflicts-law approach. Maduro defines the law’s proper objective as: 
“making national authorities, insofar as is possible, attentive to the impact of their de-
cisions on the interests of other Member States and their citizens since this goal can be 
said to be at the core of the project of European integration and to be embedded in its 
rules.”154 
He arrives at his solution in two bold steps. The first is an upgrading of the economic 
freedoms, which he had already prepared in his Ph.D.,155 and later on famously devel-
oped further.156 He transforms the “argument from external effects” into a legal duty to 
respect the extra-territorial interests of economic actors: 
                                                 
152  See paras. 138-140. 
153  Para. 1. 
154  Ibid. 
155  M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitu-
tion,(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), p. 150 et seq. 
156  Very markedly, for example, in Viking, note 108 supra, and in his opinion in Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és 
Szolgáltató bt, delivered on 22 May 2008. 
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“[T]he rules of free movement aim at eliminating any restriction imposed by a Member 
State on economic activity in or with another Member State. A cross-border element is 
required but that cross-border element does not need to involve an actual hindrance of 
free movement from or to the State imposing the measure. It is sufficient that the extra-
territorial application of that State measure may affect economic activity in another 
Member State or between other Member States.”157 
This move implies that it is up to Austria to justify the impact of its restrictive non-
authorisation policy on the Czech Republic. In this respect, he seems to proceed more 
subtly than the ECJ. The duty to take the impact of Austrian decisions on its neighbours 
into account is, indeed, an implication of the “argument from external effects”.158 It is 
also worth noting that the AG does not camouflage the lacunae of European law in the 
present constellation.159 This argument, however, if taken seriously, would have to work 
both ways. The Czech Republic must take the concerns of its neighbours seriously. This 
is precisely the type of “true” conflict which should, according to the conflicts of law 
theory of the American conflicts scholar Brainerd Currie, be brought to a higher legisla-
tive authority. Although AG Maduro does not refer to such theorising, he seems to be 
perfectly aware of the problématique to which Brainerd Curie responded in such an 
uncomfortable way. He implicitly subscribes to the “true conflict” analysis with his no-
tion of “reciprocal externalities”160 – and then seeks to forego Currie’s non possumus in 
a search for a reconciliation of both concerns: 
“In balancing the achievement of public policy goals, such as protection of human 
health and property rights, with the restriction of rights protected by Article 43 EC and 
other free movement provisions which a refusal to recognise a Czech authorisation will 
entail, the Austrian court must take account of the fact that Community law specifically 
authorises the development of nuclear installations and the development of nuclear in-
dustries in general. It must also give weight to the fact that the authorisation granted to 
the Temelín facility by the Czech authorities was granted in accordance with the stan-
dards established by the relevant Community law.”161 
The first step in the argument sounds nothing but logical; the second, however, is not 
easily reconciled with the AG’s observation that “the EAEC rules are only aimed at 
regulating the conditions under which a nuclear facility should be authorised to oper-
                                                 
157  Thus AG Maduro in para. 16 of his opinion in Case 115/08, para. 16. delivered on 22 April 2009. 
158  See Somek, note 92 above. 
159  Ibid., paras. 1, 13. 
160  AG Maduro, note 153. 
161  AG Maduro, ibid., para. 16. 
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ate”.162 It is by no means clear why such regulations should trump Austria’s constitu-
tionalised “No” to atomic energy. 
VI.3.  Quis iudicabit in “true conflicts”? 
Would the conflicts-law approach provide a superior response? Its analysis would, at 
least, be closer to the challenging issues of our case. We can identify no less than seven 
queries: 
(1) There is a horizontal conflict between two Member States. The Czech Repub-
lic has opted for; Austria has opted against, atomic energy. Is the Czech Re-
public entitled to expose Austria to the risks of atomic energy? Is Austria enti-
tled to impose its views on the Czech Republic? 
(2) There is a vertical conflict between European law and Austrian law if we as-
sume that the EA-Treaty’s encouragement of atomic energy trumps Austrian 
constitutional law. 
(3) There is also a vertical conflict if we assume that the economic freedoms are 
supreme. 
(4) There is a “diagonal” conflict between the two levels of government if we as-
sume that the EA-Treaty is incomplete and respects the autonomy of the 
Member States in the realm of atomic energy policy. 
(5) Can we read the European competence to establish safety standards as a reso-
lution of the conflict, or is that a spurious response? 
(6) The most challenging conflict is temporal: Back in 1957, atomic energy was 
not a nightmare but a cherished future. How can the law get away from a Pan-
glossian past? 
(7) Last, but not least: Quis judicabit? Is the European Court of Justice legitimated 
to decide upon all this? 
Let us first re-consider the Weberian flavour to the refusal of Austria’s Oberster 
Gerichtshof to acknowledge the authorisation granted in the Czech Republic.163 Why not 
read this disrespect as a tribute to the political nature of decisions on high-risk activities 
and the need for a democratic basis to such decisions? Why not take it seriously, in legal 
terms, that the authorisation granted by the Czech Republic would not have been con-
ceivable under Austrian law? Here, we return to the beginning: Does European law enti-
tle the Czech Republic to impose risks on Austria which Austria is not prepared to take? 
In the shadow of the noble anti-discrimination principle, the ECJ has decided upon a 
politically highly-sensitive issue. Would it have been better to decide in Austria’s fa-
                                                 
162  AG Maduro, ibid., para 13. 
163  See IV.2.1. supra. 
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vour? Normative reasons can be given. Atomic energy imposes ultra-hazardous risks. 
They produce irreversible damages if they materialise. Hence, they must not be taken. 
It would seem problematic, however, to entrust a Court with the task of taking such a 
decision. It seems, in such a case, even more stringent than in the types of “true con-
flicts” which Brainerd Currie had in mind when he argued that their resolution should 
be left to a higher legislative authority (namely, Congress in the American federal sys-
tem).164 Europe, hélas, has no authority like this. Was the conflict not left to the political 
process then? Here, just as in Viking, the ECJ did not hesitate to take a decision. This is 
a dis-empowerment of politics by law. How responsible would it be to re-deliver the 
case into Europe’s political arenas? After Fukushima, it seems likely that the contest 
over atomic energy is arriving precisely there anyway, even though Europe remains 
well-advised to debate its safety standards. 
VII.  THE “GEOLOGY” OF CONTEMPORARY LAW AND THE PROJECT OF A 
THREE-DIMENSIONAL CONFLICTS LAW 
“Unity in Diversity”, unitas in pluralitate, the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, trans-
poses the European ambitions and the perspectives of the conflicts-law approach. Nei-
ther the significance of this motto, nor its translation into the language and proceduralis-
ing methodology of the conflicts-law approach are confined to Europe’s postnational 
constellation. The need to cope with conflicting policies and to ensure the legitimacy of 
both their “weight” and their co-ordination is present at all levels of governance, in the 
international system as well as within constitutional democracies. At all levels, this 
problématique has provoked a turn to “proceduralisation”, and fostered the insight that 
legal decision-making cannot be deductive, but must be constructive and must derive its 
legitimacy from the quality of the procedures guiding its decision-making processes. 
The identification of this problématique at all levels of governance and in the “diagonal 
conflicts constellations” between them, which multi-level constellations generate, is just 
one message of the conflicts-law approach, which these concluding remarks wish to 
underline. Equally important is a second message which requires a three-dimensional 
differentiation of the conflicts-law approach. The title of this section alludes to this sec-
ond message. “Geology” is a term borrowed from Joseph Weiler, who introduced it to 
explain transformations of international law of paradigmatic importance.165 “Interna-
tional law as Regulation” is a notion which he contrasts with “international law as 
                                                 
164  See B. Currie, “The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function”,, in 
idem, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1958), pp. 188-282, at 272. 
165  J.H.H. Weiler, “The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy”, 
(2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV), pp. 547-562, at 552. 
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Transaction” and “international law as Community”. It represents “a new mode of in-
ternational law, specific in its normativity and legitimacy”. This latter insight corre-
sponds to the grand debates on the new functions and normative qualities of the law of 
post-laissez faire welfare states, which dominated the agenda of the pre- and post-1968 
generations. 
VII.1. Post-interventionist Law and the Turn to Regulation and 
Governance 
These two generations witnessed, or participated in, two big waves of theorising. The 
first wave was preoccupied with the social deficits and methodological flaws of “legal 
formalism”; the replacement of formalism by substantive rationality criteria was the 
slogan of the day.166 “Law as regulation” was not the (then) prevailing terminology; sub-
stantive rationality was to be carried into law through “interventionism”. As all this did 
not really work out, a second wave of theorising was initiated: substantive rationality 
was replaced by post-interventionist programming, in particular through reflexive law 
and the quest for a proceduralisation of the category of law.167 
These moves sought to come to grips with the law’s assumption of and involvement 
in ever new tasks and problem-solving activities. The search for post-interventionist 
programming (“governance structures” is the now widely-used term) and legal method-
ologies sought – or should have sought - to reconcile the erosion of formerly “condi-
tional” legal programmes with the legacy of the rule of law and the idea of law-
mediated legitimacy of democratic rule. Nobody has characterised this new challenge as 
pointedly as Rudolf Wiethölter in one of his early essays: “Purposive programming” is 
the living law and legal conditio sine qua non and lifeblood (“Lebenselexier”) of mod-
ern democracies, he wrote back in 1973,168 and complemented this message in 1977 
through the discovery of the affinities or structural analogies with conflict of laws.169 In 
                                                 
166  See Ch. Joerges, “Politische Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal Studies: Points of Contacts and Divergencies”, in: 
idem. & D.M. Trubek (eds), Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1989), pp. 597-643, at 611 et seq, republished  in 12 German Law Journal 554-598 (2011), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1333 
167  See Ch. Joerges, ibid., p. 626 et seq., and previously G. Brüggemeier & Ch. Joerges, “Workshop zu Konzepten 
des postinterventionistischen Rechts”, Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik, Materialien 4, Bremen 1984. 
168  See his “Rechtswissenschaft in Kritik und als Kritik”, (Critique of legal science and legal science as critique), 
(Mainz: Universitätschriften, 1973), available at: http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/l_Personal/em_profs/ 
wiethoelter/RWTexte/KritikalsRecht_Sonderdruck.pdf. 
169  R Wiethölter, “Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz – Falsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: 
Bemerkungen zur selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm”, in: A. Lüderitz et al. (eds), Festschrift für Gerhard Kegel, 
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the meantime, he had already proclaimed the need for a “proceduralisation of the cate-
gory of law”.170 
Practice, sociological research, and theoretical reflections did not come to a stand-
still. We have been accustoming ourselves to ever more sophisticated regulatory pro-
gramming for many years (now), and we have, more recently, witnessed a turn to “gov-
ernance”, a notion encompassing a grand variety of widely-used co-operative arrange-
ments between governmental and non-governmental actors. There is neither space nor 
need to elaborate on all issues. The only observation to be underlined concerns the 
structural parallels in the national and the post-national constellations. The geology 
which Joseph Weiler has depicted in international law can be observed at all levels, 
even within constitutional law. Parallel structures generate similar challenges. Regula-
tory politics need to be institutionalised and governance arrangements established both 
within the European Union and beyond its “borders”. The practical challenges and nor-
mative problems that these developments pose, however, vary considerably. 
VII.2. The Need for a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law 
Throughout the preceding sections, we have dealt with primary and secondary European 
law on the one hand, and the legal systems of the Member States on the other. The so-
ciological background analytics and the normative premises of the doctrinal fabric of 
the conflicts approach can, quite plausibly, claim to capture the distinctiveness of the 
EU multi-level system and its vertical, horizontal, and diagonal conflicts adequately. 
With regard to the latter, it should have become particularly apparent why the conflicts-
law approach cannot be reduced to the choice of a particular legal order. However, 
European conflicts law is also distinct in the conceptualisation of “vertical” and “hori-
zontal” conflicts. Its rules and principles are supranationally valid, and, in this respect, 
stronger than the legal regimes established by international law; equally unique is the 
degree to which European law has transformed the comitas among Member States into 
binding legal-commitments.171 However, this conflicts-law system is by no means com-
prehensive. The structural reasons have just been addressed: the transformations which 
                                                                                                                                               
(Frankfurt aM: Metzner, 1977), pp. 213-263. G. Teubner, “Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, 
Wiethölter”, in: O. Perez & G. Teubner (eds), Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law, (Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing, 2005), pp. 41-64; partisan positions are cited there in note 5; to be added to this list is now G. Conway, “Val-
ues and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law”, note 107 supra, Chapter 1 and passim. 
170  “Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law”, in: G. Teubner (ed), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare 
State, (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), pp. 221-249. 
171  For a comparison with WTO law, see R. Howse & K. Nicolaïdis, “Democracy without Sovereignty”, note 92 
supra, and Ch. Joerges, Three-dimensional Conflicts Law”, note 93 supra. 
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have occurred at the national level in the turn to regulation and governance are also un-
der way in the EU and in the international system. 
Regulatory politics in the European Union have led to the establishment of complex 
transnational non-legislative, quasi-administrative regimes, which have been character-
ised as a second dimension of conflicts law. It responds to the irrefutable need to ac-
company the Europeanisation of the economy by transnational regulatory politics which 
must operate outside the administrative-law frameworks which nation states have at 
their disposal. These needs have triggered the co-operation of national bureaucracies 
with networks of epistemic communities and with the European Commission in the 
much criticised - but also much praised - comitology system, the establishment of ever 
more European agencies most of which are without genuine decision-making powers. 
Also in this context does the conflicts-law approach seek to defend the idea of the rule 
of law and law-mediated legitimacy. Its constitutional hopes and prospects focus on the 
quality of transnational decisions-making and its anchoring in, and supervision by, de-
mocratically legitimated actors – hence, again, on a proceduralisation of law.172 
The third dimension of conflicts law reacts to the “privatisation” of regulative tasks 
and the development of new “governance arrangements”, which can also be observed at 
national level, but which are, unsurprisingly, particularly important at transnational lev-
els.173 Any sharp differentiation between primarily administratively-anchored regulative 
forms with which the conflicts law of the second dimension is concerned by the primar-
ily private regimes is not possible because of the participation of expert communities 
and societal actors in both of them. What the law needs to be concerned about is the 
regulative function which both types exercise; and what it has to consider is its potential 
to ensure their legitimacy. The conflicts-law approach in its third dimension does, there-
fore, not qualify these regimes complacently and without further ado as transnational 
“law”. Instead, it seeks to develop and promote the impact of normative yardsticks for 
their recognition by democratic legal orders; it, furthermore, builds upon the law’s 
shadow, particularly the interests of non-statal orders in external recognition and their 
ensuing readiness to subject themselves to a stringent procedural discipline.174 
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VII.3. The Mandate of the ECJ in Conflicts-law Perspectives 
Critical assessments of the ECJ, as they have been submitted above, are apparently dif-
ficult to digest even in the relatively progressive law quarters of European law scholar-
ship and with the critics who are stigmatised as “enemies”.175 The circle of potential 
addresses is widening. It not only includes political organisations such as trade unions, 
but may also be directed against those who argue that the ECJ operated outside good 
legal manners in the Mangold case,176 and without further ado, it included the German 
Constitutional Court after its pronouncements on the Treaty of Lisbon.177 The discovery 
of such enemies may, however, signal more of a crisis of the courts and the Dominicans 
among their academic allies, than some malicious anti-European scepticism among its 
critics. It should be recalled that the first seminal article on the constitutionalising activ-
ity of the ECJ explained the Court’s success by the fact that the ECJ operated “tucked 
away in the fairytale Kingdom of Luxembourg”.178 Eric Stein’s most famous disciple 
warned, as early as 1994, that the “extended honeymoon” between the Court and its 
interlocutors may have come to an end.179 We know, indeed, too much about the context 
and the conditions which have fostered the broad acceptance of the Court’s jurispru-
dence simply to assume that the Court’s performance and the Court’s recognition by its 
interlocutors will remain stable.180 
Should the impact of the ECJ have resulted from the belief in the non-partisan and 
the non-political nature of its adjudication and the beneficial effects of these beliefs, the 
conflicts-law approach has to plead guilty to the accusation of not respecting this fic-
tion. This unmasking of what cannot be concealed anyway builds upon both the many 
conclusive analyses of the ECJ in particular and the politicisation of the integration pro-
                                                 
175  See Franz C. Mayer, “Der EuGH als Feind? Die Debatte um das soziale Europa in der europäischen Rechtspre-
chung”, (2009) 14 Integration, pp. 247-265. 
176  See D. Grimm, “Die große Karlsruher Verschiebung”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.09.2010, Nr. 209, 
p. 8. 
177  Note 23 supra. 
178  E. Stein, “Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution”, (1981) 75 American Journal of 
International Law, pp. 1-27. 
179  J.H.H. Weiler, “The Least Dangerous Branch: A Retrospective and Prospective of the ECJ in the Arena of Politi-
cal Integration”, in: idem, The Constitution of Europe. “Do the new clothes have an Emperor?”, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 188-218, at 206. 
180  A. Vauchez, “The transnational politics of judicialization. Van Gend en Loos and the making of EU polity”‚ 
(2010) 16 European Law Journal, pp. 1-28. 
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ject as a whole.181 The state of the Union is too critical, and the integration project too 
precious to benefit from this type of critical exchange. Europe and its Court would de-
serve a more serious effort. Lawyers and political scientists have produced very strong 
analyses of the Court’s performance and impact.182 It is, nevertheless, stunning to ob-
serve how cautious the maître penseur of constitutional and legal theory operates when 
it comes to defining the theoretical basis and legitimate functions of the ECJ.183 What 
these analyses do not include is a political theory of the kind and of the quality of the 
theorising on constitutional courts and their legitimacy. The conflicts-law approach 
cannot claim to fill this gap conclusively. The distinction, however, between the super-
vision of political powers within constitutional democracies on the one hand, and the 
compensation of democracy failures of nation states by European law on the other, 
should at least provide some new orientation for further research. 
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